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Black Voices Matter Too: Counter-Narrating Smithers v The Queen 
Abstract 
This article presents a legal history and counter-narrative of the Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous 
1977 decision in Smithers v The Queen. Smithers is a criminal law case that focused largely on the issue 
of causation and is likely taught in most if not all Canadian law faculties annually. The case arose out of a 
fight following a midget league hockey game where one of the combatants died. In constructing its brief 
narrative of the facts, the Court drastically understated the racial dynamics that were in play during the 
game which prompted Paul Smithers, a Black and white biracial teenager to confront Barrie Cobby, who 
was white, and his primary racial antagonist. In framing its narrative, the Court caricatured Smithers as a 
Black aggressor preying on Cobby. Drawing from critical race theory, this article advances a detailed 
counter-narrative challenging the Court’s official account which ignored Paul Smithers’s experiences and 
interpretation of events leading to Cobby’s death. The article relies on primary sources such as the 
original trial transcripts including Smithers’s testimony and those of defence witnesses. It also draws on 
the parties’ factums and newspaper articles published contemporaneously with the original trial, in 
addition to those published as the case was being appealed. Such news articles include interviews with 
key witnesses like Smithers and other individuals, which provide added insights on what transpired. 
Despite the racialized dynamics located within the decision, it has been overlooked in various Canadian 
legal histories centered on race. Thus, the article seeks to fill a gap in the scholarly literature on race and 
Canadian legal history. Through a broader historical account offered in this study, one learns not only 
about the intentional omissions in the Court’s narrative in a racially polarized case, but that its 
construction of events and of the accused effectively and implicitly advanced a white supremacist 
account of what took place. In addition to scrutinizing the Court’s narrative, this study examines how 
Crown prosecutors minimized the role of racism within the case and its impact on Smithers. Lastly, this 
article emphasizes how racial bias may have played a role in one of the juror’s decision-making, rendering 
Smithers’s conviction suspect. 
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Black Voices Matter Too:  
Counter-Narrating Smithers v The Queen
AMAR KHODAY*
This article presents a legal history and counter-narrative of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
unanimous 1977 decision in Smithers v The Queen. Smithers is a criminal law case that focused 
largely on the issue of causation and is likely taught in most if not all Canadian law faculties 
annually. The case arose out of a fight following a midget league hockey game where one 
of the combatants died. In constructing its brief narrative of the facts, the Court drastically 
understated the racial dynamics that were in play during the game which prompted Paul 
Smithers, a Black and white biracial teenager to confront Barrie Cobby, who was white, and 
his primary racial antagonist. In framing its narrative, the Court caricatured Smithers as a 
Black aggressor preying on Cobby.
Drawing from critical race theory, this article advances a detailed counter-narrative 
challenging the Court’s official account which ignored Paul Smithers’s experiences and 
interpretation of events leading to Cobby’s death. The article relies on primary sources such as 
the original trial transcripts including Smithers’s testimony and those of defence witnesses. 
It also draws on the parties’ factums and newspaper articles published contemporaneously 
with the original trial, in addition to those published as the case was being appealed. Such 
news articles include interviews with key witnesses like Smithers and other individuals, 
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which provide added insights on what transpired. Despite the racialized dynamics located 
within the decision, it has been overlooked in various Canadian legal histories centered on 
race. Thus, the article seeks to fill a gap in the scholarly literature on race and Canadian 
legal history. Through a broader historical account offered in this study, one learns not only 
about the intentional omissions in the Court’s narrative in a racially polarized case, but that 
its construction of events and of the accused effectively and implicitly advanced a white 
supremacist account of what took place. In addition to scrutinizing the Court’s narrative, this 
study examines how Crown prosecutors minimized the role of racism within the case and its 
impact on Smithers. Lastly, this article emphasizes how racial bias may have played a role in 
one of the juror’s decision-making, rendering Smithers’s conviction suspect.
RACIAL VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE1 has been a persistent problem in 
North America and elsewhere for centuries. Though such racial violence was 
already well-known among Black communities—given their lived experiences—
over the past decade there has been a renewed sense of urgency to confront the 
unwarranted state and non-state violence inflicted on such communities. This 
reinvigorated consciousness has given rise to the Black Lives Matter movement, 
1. Though I use the term “people” here, I recognize that this singularity can often obscure the 
diverse experiences and identities that individuals within a notional group or community 
might have, for example, with respect to gender, sexual orientation, socio-economic status, 
disability, age, language, national origins, or other characteristics. Yet, when it comes to 
racism in North America and elsewhere, this discrimination is arguably a common aspect 
that most Black people as well as Indigenous people and people of colour face, regardless of 
other identities. That said, the experience of racism may intersect with other identities.
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which was started in the United States and has spread well beyond its borders.2 
The 25 May 2020 police murder of George Floyd, a Black man in Minnesota, 
has, in particular, inspired an upsurge in public protests in the United States.3 
Not forgotten, however, are the many prior and subsequent homicides or acts 
of aggression perpetrated by police officers across the country. The protests have 
expanded beyond the United States and emerged in countries, such as Canada, 
that have their own very troubled histories of racial violence against Black people, 
Indigenous people, and people of colour.
This broader and more sensitive awareness has been partly due, 
in no insignificant measure, to various video recordings capturing lethal or 
otherwise brutal police conduct toward Black lives.4 Such striking visual evidence 
and the proliferation of protests seem to have motivated responses from various 
public officials and institutions, however belated, to recognize systemic racism 
in their midst. For example, in a noteworthy letter issued by the Washington 
Supreme Court to members of the state judiciary and legal profession, the 
justices provided several significant acknowledgments concerning systemic 
discrimination against Black people.5 Writing collectively, the justices asserted, 
“The devaluation and degradation of [B]lack lives is not a recent event. It is a 
persistent and systemic injustice that predates this nation’s founding.”6 The court 
rooted the injustice plaguing the country in “the individual and collective actions 
of many, and it cannot be addressed without the individual and collective actions 
2. See Garrett Chase, “The Early History of the Black Lives Matter Movement, and the 
Implications Thereof” (2018) 18 Nev LJ 1091. 
3. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, “George Floyd Protests: A Timeline,” The New York Times 
(28 March 2021), online: <www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html>; 
Helier Cheung, “George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are So Powerful This Time,” BBC 
News (8 June 2020), online: <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905>; Jason 
Silverstein, “The Global Impact of George Floyd: How Black Lives Matter Protests Shaped 
Movements Around the World” (4 June 2021), online: CBS News <www.cbsnews.com/news/
george-floyd-black-lives-matter-impact>. 
4. See Nicol Turner Lee, “Where Would Racial Progress in Policing Be Without Camera 
Phones” (5 June 2020), online: Brookings <www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/05/
where-would-racial-progress-in-policing-be-without-camera-phones>; “Black Lives Upended 
By Policing: The Raw Videos Sparking Outrage,” The New York Times (19 April 2018), 
online: <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/19/us/police-videos-race.html>. 
5. Letter from the Supreme Court, State of Washington, to Members of the Judiciary 
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of us all.”7 Assuming responsibility for its own institutional contribution to such 
actions, the court posited, “As judges, we must recognize the role we have played 
in devaluing [B]lack lives.”8 While recognizing the inability to turn back time, 
they affirmed, “We can develop a greater awareness of our own conscious and 
unconscious biases in order to make just decisions in individual cases.”9 
The Washington Supreme Court’s admission of its own participation in 
devaluing Black lives should inspire the judiciary in other jurisdictions to reflect 
on their own past and present conduct. There are lessons to be learned from our 
legal pasts. Correspondingly, legal scholars and historians can play an important 
function in researching when, why, and how such judicial devaluations have 
transpired. These lessons may be instructive for courts, the practicing bar, and 
those teaching and learning within the legal academy and cognate disciplines. 
Interrogating past decisions is also important where the judicial depreciation 
of Black lives may neither be especially obvious from reading a particular 
decision nor necessarily reflected in the outcome. Needless to say, racism has 
been a persistent scourge affecting countless societies, including Canada’s. 
Despite refusals by many, including some political figures, Canadian courts have 
recognized valid and tangible concerns about systemic racism within the country.10 
Various scholars have documented Canada’s long-standing and endemic racism 




10. See R v Williams, [1998] 1 SCR 1128; R v Parks (1993), 84 CCC (3d) 353 (Ont CA) 
[Parks]; R v Morris, 2018 ONSC 5186; R v Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527; R v Le, 2019 SCC 
34. However, such recognition has not always been consistent, and courts have not been as 
attentive to concerns about race as they should have. See David M Tanovich, “The Charter 
of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal 
Justice System” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 655; Amar Khoday, “Ending the Erasure?: Writing 
Race into the Story of Psychological Detentions–Examining R. v. Le” (2021) 100 SCLR (2d) 
165 at 169-72. 
11. For examples of such scholarship, see Eric M Adams, “Errors of Fact and Law: Race, 
Space, and Hockey in Christie v York” (2012) 62 UTLJ 463; Constance Backhouse, 
Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada 1900–1950 (University of Toronto Press 
for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1999) [Backhouse, Colour-Coded]; 
Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada From Slavery to the Present 
(Fernwood, 2017); Clayton James Mosher, Discrimination and Denial: Systemic Racism in 
Ontario’s Legal and Criminal Justice Systems, 1892–1961 (University of Toronto Press, 1998); 
Esmeralda MA Thornhill, “So Seldom For Us, So Often Against Us: Blacks and Law in 
Canada” (2008) 38 J Black Studies 321; Barrington Walker, Race on Trial: Black Defendants 
in Ontario’s Criminal Courts, 1858–1958 (University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2010); James W St G Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law 
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valuable contributions, there continues to be ample room for more academic 
engagement with our legal histories and the involvement that racism and racists 
have played in them. One need not go back too far in time. Objects in our 
historical mirror may be closer than they appear.
In this vein, and drawing from critical race theory, this article will examine 
the factual and racialized context of Smithers v The Queen (Smithers), a unanimous 
1977 Supreme Court of Canada decision authored by Justice Brian Dickson (as 
he then was).12 During a 1974 trial, an all-white jury convicted Paul Douglas 
Smithers of unlawful act manslaughter in connection with the death of Barrie 
Ross Cobby. Smithers is the son of a Black father and white mother (Donald and 
Joyce Smithers). Though Smithers is biracial, the Court identified him as Black, 
and certainly he was verbally and physically attacked because of his Blackness. 
Cobby was white and the son of two British-born immigrant parents (Leonard 
and Brenda Cobby). Smithers and Cobby were both sixteen years old at the 
time of Cobby’s death. The case is read annually in criminal law courses across 
Canada as part of a suite of judgments that illustrate, among other things, the 
legal standard for proving legal causation in homicide cases.13 In undertaking 
a legal history of this decision, my goal will be to excavate the traumatic racial 
violence perpetrated against Smithers by various actors, including the deceased. 
When one reads the Court’s interpretation of the facts from the case and the 
decision as a whole, one might be forgiven for failing to notice or remember the 
role that racism played in the events leading to Cobby’s death. For this, I argue, 
the Court bears significant responsibility. 
In order to situate the reader, I furnish the facts as presented in the decision 
now. I later provide a counter-narrative and legal history that challenges this 
account. The portion that follows the ellipses in the passage quoted below appears 
later in the decision (in connection with the Court’s dismissal of the claim of 
self-defence), but it provides critical insight into the Court’s perception of what 
took place and its construction of Smithers and Cobby as participants:
On February 18, 1973 a hockey game was played between the Applewood Midget 
Team and the Cooksville Midget Team at the Cawthra Park Arena in the Town of 
Mississauga. The leading player on the Applewood team was the deceased, Barrie 
Cobby, sixteen years of age; the leading player on the Cooksville team was the 
appellant. The game was rough, the players were aggressive and feelings ran high. The 
in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies (The Osgoode Society for Canadian 
Legal History & Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1997).
12. [1978] 1 SCR 506 [Smithers]. 
13. See R v Harbottle, [1993] 3 SCR 306; R v Nette, 2001 SCC 78; R v Maybin, 2012 SCC 24. 
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appellant, who is black, was subjected to racial insults by Cobby and other members 
of the Applewood team. Following a heated and abusive exchange of profanities, 
the appellant and Cobby were both ejected from the game. The appellant made 
repeated threats that he was going to “get” Cobby. Cobby was very apprehensive and 
left the arena at the end of the game, some forty-five minutes later, accompanied by 
eight or ten persons including friends, players, his coach and the team’s manager. 
The appellant repeated his threats and challenges to fight as the group departed. 
Cobby did not take up the challenge. Instead, he hurried toward a waiting car. The 
appellant caught up with him at the bottom of the outside steps and directed one or 
two punches to Cobby’s head. Several of Cobby’s team mates grabbed the appellant 
and held him. Cobby, who had taken no steps to defend himself, was observed to 
double up and stand back while the appellant struggled to free himself from those 
holding him. While Cobby was thus bent over, and approximately two to four feet 
from the appellant, the appellant delivered what was described as a hard, fast kick 
to Cobby’s stomach area. Only seconds elapsed between the punching and the kick. 
Following the kick, Cobby groaned, staggered towards his car, fell to the ground on 
his back, and gasped for air. Within five minutes he appeared to stop breathing. He 
was dead upon arrival at the Mississauga General Hospital.
…
Although undoubtedly much upset by the actions and language of Cobby during 
the first ten minutes of play, thereafter the appellant alone was the aggressor. He 
relentlessly pursued Cobby some forty-five minutes later for the purpose of carrying 
out his threats to “get” Cobby.14
In this article, I shall demonstrate that the Smithers decision presented a rather 
succinct, but altogether uncomplicated and largely one-sided narrative regarding 
what transpired, including the fight that led to Cobby’s untimely death. As can 
be understood from the excerpt above, the Court acknowledged only once in its 
judgment, and summarily, that Smithers was subjected to racial insults. In doing 
so, the Court drastically understated and omitted the significant role that racism 
played in provoking Smithers to confront Cobby. This is striking, especially given 
that Smithers is a decision that focuses notionally on the theme of causation. 
To the extent that the Court even barely recognized the racism to which Smithers 
was subjected, this reality was functionally offset by its construction of Smithers 
and the broader narrative. Through its interpretation of what transpired and, just 
as critically, its omissions from that story, the Court painted Smithers as a Black 
“aggressor” who stalked his (white) prey for some forty-five minutes. It is Cobby 
who is portrayed effectively as the sympathetic, youthful, white victim who 
14. Smithers, supra note 12 at 508-09, 522. 
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purportedly sought to avoid a physical confrontation but was relentlessly pursued 
by an incensed Black male: Smithers. 
Through this article, I shall argue that issues of race permeated various 
aspects of the Smithers case, including the Court’s account of what transpired, 
the manner in which the Crown prosecutors at trial minimized the role of racism 
and its impact on Smithers, and concerns about racial bias with respect to at 
least one juror. In Part II, below, I offer a more complex history of the case and 
a counter-narrative of the events leading up to Cobby’s death—an account that 
challenges the Court’s rendition. This shall include an alternative narrative of the 
fight itself as seen primarily through the eyes of Smithers and revealed during his 
trial testimony. As the case is taught annually in law school, one of my objectives 
is to encourage scrutiny regarding the facts we receive from appellate judgments. 
Presenting a counter-story that highlights Smithers’s account of what transpired 
would not necessarily have changed the outcome of the Court’s decision. This is 
especially the case in Smithers, where a jury preferred the Crown’s evidence and 
concluded Smithers’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.15 That said, in Part IV, 
below, I identify reasons to consider that one or more jurors were racially biased.
Another purpose in undertaking this study is to humanize Smithers, who 
is perpetually vilified through the Court’s prose. To be clear, my goal is not to 
beatify Smithers, but rather to contextualize and understand his actions as a victim 
of racial aggression. Through this counter-narrative, I shall also demonstrate 
that the deceased, while clearly not deserving of death, was no mere victim. 
Rather, Cobby was a racial antagonist whose conduct contributed significantly 
to Smithers’s determination to confront him regarding his racism during the 
hockey game and subsequent reluctance to apologize.16 In purposely omitting a 
more nuanced account and portraying Smithers as a Black aggressor, the Court 
effectively (even if unintentionally) legitimized a white supremacist account of the 
events. Generally, white supremacy has been explained as “a political, economic, 
and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material 
15. For instance, on the matter of legal causation, which is the primary reason the case is 
included in Canadian criminal law textbooks, the Court stated, “[I]t may shortly be said that 
there was a very substantial body of evidence, both expert and lay, before the jury indicating 
that the kick [delivered by Smithers] was at least a contributing cause of death, outside the 
de minimis range, and that is all that the Crown was required to establish.” Smithers, supra 
note 12 at 519. Thus, even if the Court constructed a more comprehensive narrative, the 
testimony of Crown witnesses provided sufficient evidence, which, if believed, could sustain a 
finding for legal causation. 
16. I should add that had he lived, Cobby might have matured, reflected on his racist attitudes, 
and looked back at his behaviour toward Smithers with deep regret. 
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL574
resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement 
are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination 
are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings.”17 
By simultaneously purging Smithers’s account and those of defence witnesses 
from the official narrative, the Court furthered a tale that accentuated Cobby’s 
victimhood as a young white male, while largely concealing the racist aggression 
Smithers endured at the hands of white players and spectators, alongside the 
neglect of white hockey officials who failed to intervene. In so doing, I contend 
that the Court devalued Smithers’s voice as a Black person fighting against the 
racism he was subjected to. By re-inscribing Smithers’s subjectivity through a 
counter-narrative, I argue that Smithers engaged in acts of resistance, however 
imperfect, tragic, and unintended in their outcome, to the anti-Black racism that 
plagued him and the systemic nature that allowed it to persist. Smithers was both 
a victim of white supremacy and someone who resisted it. This was a narrative 
that was left out of the Court’s decision. 
In order to present a counter-narrative that in many ways inverts the Court’s 
account, I draw on official and unofficial sources, including those available to 
the Court. With respect to official sources, I rely on a specific portion of the 
original trial transcript and the parties’ factums. The trial transcript consisted of 
five volumes, of which volume four comprised the direct and cross-examination 
of defence witnesses, including Smithers. Given that the Court’s interpretation 
of events already reflects a prosecution-friendly perspective that was clearly 
more sympathetic to Cobby, my goal here, drawing from critical race theory, 
is to offer a historical counter-narrative based principally on volume four of 
the trial transcript. In addition, I rely on numerous newspaper articles written 
during the 1970s, including those published in The Toronto Star, The Globe and 
Mail, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. Some of these articles were 
contemporaneous to the trial that occurred in April 1974, while others were 
published following the trial and as the case was being appealed to the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada. In the post-trial 
articles, Smithers and other individuals familiar with the case gave interviews and 
offered perspectives which reinforced or, in some circumstances, drew attention 
to facets which may not have been present or apparent in the official sources 
17. Cheryl I Harris, “Whiteness as Property” (1993) 106 Harv L Rev 1707 at 1714, n 10, 
citing Frances Lee Ansley, “Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights 
Scholarship” (1989) 74 Cornell L Rev 993 at 1024, n 129. Interestingly, Ibram X Kendi 
explains how white supremacy often works to the detriment of white people in a variety of 
ways. See How to Be an Antiracist (One World, 2019) at 131-32.
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mentioned above. These include concerns related to allegedly racist attitudes held 
by one or more jury members that prompted Smithers’s appellate counsel Roy 
McMurtry, in 1975, to seek federal ministerial review of the decision to convict 
Smithers at trial. 
This article tells a story concerning overt acts of anti-Black racism. The 
narrative includes the utterance of vile and destructive words synonymous with 
such discrimination. As a person of colour who is not Black, I do not claim any 
license to employ such racist terms in an unrestricted manner. When not quoting 
from sources, and in instances where I refer generally to the most common and 
destructive anti-Black racist slur, I shall employ the surrogate term “n-word” 
rather than the full word that it signifies. However, when citing to publications in 
the footnotes that employ racial slurs in the titles, I have retained the unredacted 
words to account for the sources accurately. 
In telling the broader story of racism in the Smithers case, I have incorporated 
numerous statements by individuals who are Black, especially Smithers, and who, 
when speaking of their experiences of racism, employed the actual racist terms 
to explain what was said to them as well as the terms’ damaging effects. When 
quoting such statements, I have chosen to reproduce the racist slurs in a redacted 
form by encapsulating them in square brackets with asterisks as substitutes for 
certain letters. I should briefly explain why I have incorporated quotations with 
racial slurs in this article at all, albeit in redacted form. First, including the racist 
language found in the original texts maintains fidelity to the historical record 
located in the trial transcripts, parties’ factums, and newspaper accounts. Second, 
documenting such language shines a light on the reality and violence of overt 
anti-Black racism, which in the Smithers case was also an implicit assertion of 
white supremacy.18 Third, most of the statements quoted below that employ the 
use of racist terms were made by Black individuals themselves while sharing their 
experiences of when such slurs were deployed against them or others. I am loath 
to censor their words in an article that seeks to value Black voices and Black 
people’s experiences of racism. 
Given these stated reasons, some readers might find it odd that I would 
employ redacted forms of these racial slurs, especially when quoting from primary 
sources. I offer a few explanations for this. The sheer quantity of times that the 
n-word appears in the history of this case is far from scarce. While not all readers, 
18. Anti-Black racism is not an epidemic isolated to white supremacy. Negative and destructive 
attitudes about Black persons are shared among other people of colour, including Asians. 
See e.g. Maya Prabhu, “African victims of racism in India share their stories” (3 May 2017), 
online: Al Jazeera <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/african-victims-racism-
india-share-stories-170423093250637.html>. 
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including those who are Black, may find reading the unredacted racial slurs 
upsetting and triggering within the context of this article, others surely might for 
a host of legitimate reasons. This may prove to be a barrier to engaging with the 
article. Although the unabridged version of the n-word appears in a great deal of 
legal scholarship by Black authors from the United States,19 it is not as common 
a practice in Canadian legal scholarship to use it and certainly not as extensively 
in any one single article.20 Employing a redacted form of particular racist terms 
when quoting from primary sources still allows readers to fully understand what 
was said to Smithers and the terms’ impact on him, while maintaining fidelity 
to the original texts in which these words appear and their readability. I have not 
replaced the original words with entirely different words, which would indeed 
be falsifying the record. In my respectful view, using redacted versions of the 
racial slurs when quoting source material is a reasonable approach. It seeks to 
avoid the harm that quoting the full and unabridged racist terms would cause to 
some readers, while steering away from sanitizing the account by excluding such 
language altogether, which would replicate the Court’s approach. It is not enough 
to just state that racial slurs were directed at Smithers and to cite the relevant 
sources that corroborate this reality. As with all storytelling, it is important to 
show and not just tell about the racism Smithers was subjected to. 
This article is divided into four main parts followed by a conclusion. Part 
I situates this article within several scholarly and intellectual frameworks, 
including critical race theory and Canadian legal history and historiography 
regarding race. Part II of this article presents a more robust counter-story of 
what occurred in the Smithers case that draws upon, from the official sources 
discussed above, the largely missing perspectives of Smithers and other defence 
witnesses. This counter-narrative will, in effect, not only reveal information that 
was excluded from the Court’s narrative but will also serve as an inversion of the 
roles that Smithers and Cobby played in the official account. Part III focuses 
attention to how the prosecution’s theory of the case and the statements of the 
prosecutors minimized the pivotal role that racism played in the events leading 
to Cobby’s death, as well as the impact of such racism on Smithers as the victim 
19. See e.g. Michele Goodwin, “Nigger and the Construction of Citizenship” (2003) 76 Temp L 
Rev 129; Gregory S Parks & Shayne E Jones, ““Nigger”: A Critical Race Realist Analysis of 
the N-Word within Hate Crimes Law” (2008) 98 J Crim L & Criminology 1305; Darryll M 
Halcomb Lewis, “The Creation of a Hostile Work Environment by a Workplace Supervisor’s 
Single Use of the Epithet Nigger” (2016) 53 Am Bus LJ 383.
20. I conducted a search of Canadian law articles in Westlaw’s database using the unabridged 
version of the n-word. This search turned up roughly thirty articles. Among those, the 
unabridged version of the n-word appears typically only a few times. 
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of that prejudice. Part IV then redirects the reader to concerns relating to how 
racism may have played a role in at least one juror’s decision making, affecting 
the fairness of the trial. 
I. SITUATING THIS HISTORY
The Smithers case is rooted in racism and in the attempt to challenge such 
discrimination. In telling a different account, I have drawn on several 
interconnected forms of scholarship and intellectual frameworks and situate this 
article within such discourse. Part I(A) explains and places this work within the 
framework of critical race scholarship, its emphasis on the systemic and regularized 
nature of racism, and its use of counter-storytelling as an instrument to challenge 
official or mainstream narratives. Part I(B) locates this article within the broader 
scholarship on race and Canadian legal history. In Part I(C), I discuss writings 
concerning the damaging nature of racial slurs and their impact on Black hockey 
players in particular. Part I(D) positions this article within the social history of 
Black resistance to racial oppression. In Part I(E), I consider scholarship on judicial 
narratives and storytelling, with a focus on fact construction by appellate courts.
A. CRITICAL RACE THEORY
During the late twentieth century, critical race theory (CRT) first emerged 
as an intellectual response to the notion of colour-blindness in the context 
of institutional struggles regarding the scope of equality and the content of 
American legal education.21 Despite its origins in the legal academy, scholars in 
various other disciplines, as well as those who are based outside the United States 
(including in Canada), have come to adopt and consider CRT as a central feature 
of their work. While there is much diversity among critical race scholars, it may 
be said that there are some basic and common understandings or approaches that 
constitute this scholarship. I focus on two of these that are relevant to this article. 
First, as Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic assert, one such shared 
understanding is that racism is “ordinary, not aberrational.”22 Indeed, racism 
21. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Unmasking Colorblindness in the Law: Lessons from the 
Formation of Critical Race Theory” in Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw et al, eds, Seeing Race 
Again: Countering Colorblindness Across the Disciplines (University of California Press, 2019) 
52 at 52. Though the history and development of CRT is beyond the scope of this article, see 
also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or ‘A Foot in the 
Closing Door’” (2002) 49 UCLA L Rev 1343. 
22. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 2nd (New York University Press, 2012) at 7 [Delgado & 
Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction].
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is systemic and widespread, rather than consisting of episodic and isolated 
phenomena. Given racism’s systemic nature, CRT can provide an especially 
important lens when examining criminal law, criminal justice, and systemic 
racism.23 This can extend to the manner in which racialized groups are viewed 
and constructed as dangerous or threatening, and thus subjected to significant 
policing and heightened scrutiny.24 Examined through a critical race lens, 
there is legitimate skepticism about the roles of the adversarial system or juries 
as guarantors of racial justice, given the realities of systemic racism and the 
over-policing of racialized communities.25 Drawing on CRT, Kelsey L. Sitar 
has argued for a greater appreciation of race and racialization within various 
aspects of Canadian criminal trial processes.26 Specifically, Sitar posits that 
considerations of racial profiling and over-policing should factor into judicial 
determinations of applications arising under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms27 concerning the constitutionality of particular police detentions, 
vehicle stops, search and seizure issues, and the exclusion of evidence.28 Despite 
law’s preoccupation with race neutrality and colour-blindness in various spheres, 
policing does not occur in a social vacuum. 
A second common feature of critical race scholarship has been to expose 
various ignored or alternative realities concerning people of colour. Critical race 
scholars articulate that “whiteness is…normative; it sets the standards in dozens 
of situations.”29 By contrast, people belonging to racialized groups may simply be 
characterized or defined by their non-whiteness without any sufficient regard for 
their experiences. Given their alterity, minorities can appear in various narratives, 
including in court cases and popular culture, as villains or oversexed subjects.30 
Critical race scholars have sought to inscribe such alternative or ignored 
realities through diverse means. They have written “personal histories, parables…
23. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, “Critical Race Theory and Criminal Justice” (2007) 
31 Humanity & Society 133.
24. Ibid at 140. 
25. Ibid at 141.
26. “Gladue as a Sword: Incorporating Critical Race Perspectives into the Canadian Criminal 
Trial” (2016) 20 Can Crim L Rev 247 at 248.
27. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c 11. 
28. Sitar, supra note 26 at 254-62.
29. Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 84. 
30. Ibid. 
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poetry, fiction…revisionist histories,”31 and “counterstories,” as well as 
“investigated the factual background and personalities, frequently ignored in the 
casebooks, of well-known cases.”32 As noted above, examining and advancing 
alternative narratives to mainstream accounts of the lives and experiences of 
racialized persons and communities is important since many “members of [a] 
country’s dominant racial group,” who in turn often comprise institutions of 
power, “cannot easily grasp what it is like to be nonwhite [sic].”33 Many white and 
non-white members of society in the global north may subscribe to what Daniel 
Solórzano and Tara Yosso refer to as a “majoritarian story,” which, among other 
things, “distorts and silences the experiences of people of colour.”34
Counter-storytelling can shed light on the lived experiences of people of colour, 
which are elided or treated with insufficient sensitivity in official narratives.35 
Solórzano and Yosso define a counter-story as “a method of telling the stories of 
those people whose experiences are not often told,”36 and as “a tool for exposing, 
analyzing, and challenging the majoritarian stories of racial privilege” that may 
be silent on race.37 Counter-storytelling is important because, as Delgado and 
Stefancic remind us, “People of different races have radically different experiences 
as they go through life.”38 While individuals occupy certain normative universes 
from which they may be difficult to dislodge, “well-told stories describing the 
realit[ies]” of the lives of racialized persons can assist readers (or receivers) of 
these narratives to “bridge the gap between their worlds…and others.”39 Telling 
counter-stories is important for challenging myths and preconceptions in legal 
discourse. Delgado and Stefancic argue that “preconceptions and myths, for 
example about black criminality or Muslim terrorism, shape mind-set.”40 They 
articulate that a “mind-set” is in turn understood as the “bundle of received 
31. Charles R Lawrence III et al, “Introduction” in Mari J Matsuda et al, eds, Words that 
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Westview 
Press, 1993) 1 at 5.
32. Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 44.
33. Ibid at 45. See also Russell K Robinson, “Perceptual Segregation” (2008) 108 
Colum L Rev 1093.
34. “Critical Race Methodology: Counter-Storytelling as an Analytical Framework for Education 
Research” (2002) 8 Qualitative Inquiry 23 at 29. 
35. See Joshua Sealy-Harrington, “Untelling the Story of Race,” The Walrus (15 July 2020), 
online: <thewalrus.ca/untelling-the-story-of-race>.
36. Solórzano & Yosso, supra note 34 at 32.
37. Ibid. 
38. Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 47.
39. Ibid at 47-48. 
40. Ibid at 49.
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wisdoms, stock stories, and suppositions that allocate suspicion, place the burden 
of proof on one party or the other, and tell us in cases of divided evidence 
what probably happened.”41 Critical race writers can play a key role in using 
counter-stories to engage in resistance42 and “to challenge, displace, or mock 
these pernicious narratives and beliefs.”43
Solórzano and Yosso identify that there are, generally, at least three types 
of counter-narratives.44 The first type focuses on personal stories that are 
autobiographical in nature and explore forms of racism and sexism experienced 
by people of colour.45 The second type is more biographical in nature; they narrate 
other people’s stories, are told in the third person voice, and discuss experiences 
of racism and sexism in a sociohistorical context.46 The last type centers on 
composite stories or narratives that “draw on various forms of ‘data’ to recount 
the racialized, sexualized, and classed experiences of people of color.”47 This third 
category may provide both “autobiographical and biographical analyses because 
the authors create composite characters and place them in social, historical, 
and political situations to discuss racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of 
subordination.”48
As I undertake in this article, applying a critical race lens is vital when 
examining the historical record in criminal cases where race has largely been 
sidelined and where racialized individuals may be cast in certain roles. Drawing 
from CRT, my approach to counter-narrating the Smithers decision combines a 
revisionist approach to the legal history of this case with the second category that 
Solórzano and Yosso explain, which depicts another person’s experiences with 
racism. In telling a counter-narrative of the Smithers case, I shall illustrate the 
normalized manner in which racism was aimed at Smithers, particularly during 
his time playing hockey. Such experiences were defined by his Blackness, which 
was also notably identified in the Court’s judgment. By marking Smithers as an 
aggressor seeking to “get” Cobby for forty-five minutes, the Court cast him in the 
41. Ibid. 
42. Solórzano & Yosso, supra note 34 at 32. 
43. Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 49. 
44. Solórzano & Yosso, supra note 34 at 32. 
45. Ibid at 32-33.
46. Ibid at 33.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. For an insightful Canadian-situated example of this form of composite 
counter-storytelling, see Kanika Samuels-Wortley, “To Serve and Protect Whom? Using 
Composite Counter-Storytelling to Explore Black and Indigenous Youth Experiences and 
Perceptions of the Police in Canada” (2021) 67 Crime & Delinquency 1137. 
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role of the Black villain. Through the counter-narrative in Part II below, I hope to 
shed light on the lived experience of a racialized teenager who endured repeated 
and socially tolerated racial abuse, and to counter and invert the Court’s official 
narrative, which is read annually by students of law. 
B. RACE, LAW, AND CANADIAN HISTORY – SETTING THE HISTORICAL AND 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SCENE
Despite many Canadians’ romantic image of their nation and society as open 
and accepting,49 both historically and in our present context, this has hardly 
been everyone’s experience.50 As law is a reflection of broader cultural values, 
it has been misused as a tool for advancing racial ideologies, exclusion, and 
mistreatment. Various legal and socio-legal scholars have examined themes of race 
and racial discrimination through the law in Canadian society. Notably, among 
the scholarship written about race and legal history in Canada, the Smithers case 
does not seem to have captured any real attention.51 This is likely because the 
judgment is focused largely on the matter of causation and other legal issues. 
Regardless of the sheer abundance of evidence in the trial record concerning the 
racism that was directed at Smithers and its role in the events leading to Cobby’s 
demise, this discrimination was omitted from the Court’s decision but for a single 
sentence. The racial dimensions of this case have been substantially overlooked. 
Thus, a scholarly examination of the racial characteristics of the Smithers case has 
been absent from the rich body of work on race and Canadian legal history. This 
article seeks to address that lacuna. 
In recent decades, there has been significant work on the intersection of race 
and the law within a historical framework. For instance, Constance Backhouse 
has written about the legal history of racism in Canada. In one monograph, 
she examines the period covering 1900 to 1950 and highlights key instances 
of discrimination directed at Indigenous people, Black people, and people of 
colour in Canada. Through her work, Backhouse aims to document the “central 
role of the Canadian legal system in the establishment and enforcement of racial 
49. J Walker, supra note 11 (“Canadians perceive themselves to be tolerant of racial and cultural 
diversity, to possess a history of equal treatment towards all, to have avoided the syndrome of 
racism so evident south of the border” at 3).
50. See Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11 at 7. Backhouse asserts, “To fail to scrutinize the 
records of our past to identify the deeply implanted tenets of racist ideology and practice is 
to acquiesce in the popular misapprehension that depicts our country as largely innocent of 
systemic racial exploitation. Nothing could be more patently erroneous.”
51. Though in fairness to several scholars, some of their studies were temporally limited to 
periods that culminated before the events of the Smithers case transpired. 
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inequality.”52 She adds that the “Canadian legal system played a principal and 
dominant role in creating and preserving racial discrimination. Racism is a 
deeply embedded, archly defining characteristic of Canadian history.”53 In other 
work, Backhouse observes that, in many decisions, judges have failed to account 
for the racial identities of the actors involved in the events, even where cases 
revolved around arguments of racism.54 Even where visible minorities may be 
given a racial designation, white actors in these cases can remain raceless.55 
Backhouse posits, “To the individuals involved in real cases, however, race can 
be the critical variable underlying the actual dispute.”56 As the discussion in Parts 
II–IV, below, illustrates, race was a critical aspect of the Smithers case but was 
largely ignored by the Court. 
In addition to Backhouse, several scholars and writers have examined, 
specifically, the historical experience of Black Canadians in the Canadian criminal 
justice system.57 Such work has salience to the Smithers case. In one study, 
Barrington Walker focuses particularly on the treatment of Black defendants in 
Ontario between 1858–1958.58 He writes that the experience of many Black 
people was one of social exclusion and marginality with respect to places of 
employment, places where they could reside, schools they could attend, and spaces 
where they could worship.59 This extended to involvement in sports. Walker and 
other authors have shown that this racist exclusion was predicated on perceptions 
of Black inferiority and criminality, which infected the criminal justice system 
resulting in unequal treatment.60 Such notions impacted assessments of liability 
52. Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11 at 15.
53. Ibid at 17.
54. Constance Backhouse, “Bias in Canadian Law: A Lopsided Precipice,” in R v RDS: 
An Editor’s Forum, Case Comment, (1998) 10 CJWL 170 at 171-72 [Backhouse, “Bias in 
Canadian Law”]. This is, of course, not always the case, and some courts have been more 
sanguine in recent decades about the existence of racism and its impact in the criminal justice 
system. See e.g. Parks, supra note 10 at 369. 
55. Backhouse, “Bias in Canadian Law,” supra note 54 at 170-72.
56. Ibid at 172.
57. See Adams, supra note 11; Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11; Maynard, supra 
note 11; Mosher, supra note 11; Thornhill, supra note 11; B Walker, supra note 11; 
J Walker, supra note 11.
58. See B Walker, supra note 11.
59. Ibid at 3. 
60. See e.g. ibid at 20-21, 45-88, 123-31; Maynard, supra note 11 at 83-115; Mosher, supra note 
11 at 129-34, 170-74. 
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and punishment, particularly when the victims were white.61 Tropes regarding the 
assumed inferiority of Black men have also been employed by defence counsel as 
mitigating circumstances; emphasis might be placed on the purported childlike 
qualities of Black defendants.62 
There have been struggles with respect to documenting the history of Black 
Canadians through criminal law jurisprudence. As a historian, Barrington 
Walker reflects on such difficulties based on criminal case files, which can present 
methodological challenges common to all historians. Specifically, such “challenges 
stem from the well-known concerns about the fragmentary nature of case files and 
the difficulty of recovering muted voices of marginalized populations through 
documents created by elites.”63 He further contends, “The major challenge when 
one is confronted with researching the history of race on trial in a racial liberal 
order where colour-blindness is an integral part of legal formalism is the initial 
step of finding cases involving Black defendants.”64 
Fortunately, such difficulties are not present in Smithers. The Court’s own 
judgment was not entirely colour-blind; Smithers was specifically labelled as 
Black, while Cobby’s race was not identified, though likely presumed as white. 
Furthermore, the wider case record, including the appellant’s factum and the 
trial transcripts, provide a fuller, deeper, and more disturbing account pertaining 
to the role of racism in the case. Although the voices of Black defendants may 
have been muted in numerous other cases, perhaps in part because the accused 
never testified, this was not the case here. Smithers not only took the witness 
stand at his trial but also gave interviews to several journalists following the 
trial’s completion. He spoke about his experiences during hockey games and 
the need to confront the racism he faced. Thus, the source material available in 
the Smithers case, which appears in no way fragmentary, permits a deeper legal 
historical examination of the case and its situated status in the history of race and 
the law in Canada. 
61. See Mosher, supra note 11 at 194-95. Mosher states, “These interracial crimes were perceived 
as particularly problematic by court officials, and judges confirmed their disdain for those 
who crossed racial lines by invoking the full weight of the law by imposing corporal 
punishment on such offenders and by sentencing them to lengthy terms of incarceration.”
62. See B Walker, supra note 11 at 72.
63. Ibid at 12. 
64. Ibid at 13.
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C. THE “N-WORD,” HOCKEY, AND THE IMPACT OF RACIAL INSULTS
At a general level, racial insults have a damaging impact upon their recipients. 
Richard Delgado posits that the “racial insult remains one of the most pervasive 
channels through which discriminatory attitudes are imparted. Such language 
injures the dignity and self-regard of the person to whom it is addressed, 
communicating the message that distinctions of race are distinctions of merit, 
dignity, status, and personhood.”65 The psychological harms caused by racial 
stigmatization are often rather severe;66 furthermore, the harms caused by racism 
and racial labelling may have a greater impact on children than on adults.67 
Smithers was a teenager when the events in his case transpired. 
More specifically, with respect to anti-Black racism, the n-word as a racist 
insult has a lengthy and distressing history.68 Scholars have identified it as having an 
assaultive quality capable of wounding its recipients.69 Its injurious quality comes 
from certain constructed meanings. As African-American historian Elizabeth 
Stordeur Pryor explains, “Fundamentally, the n-word is an idea disguised as a 
word—that Black people are intellectually, biologically, and immutably inferior 
to white people.”70 She adds, “[T]hat inferiority means that the injustice we suffer 
and inequality we endure is essentially our own fault.”71 Pryor posits that during 
the early nineteenth century in particular, the n-word developed into a slur and 
weapon deployed against Black people as large numbers of Black people began 
to gain freedom in the northern United States.72 She articulates that the word 
became “fundamentally an assault on Black freedom, Black mobility, and Black 
aspiration. Even now, nothing so swiftly unleashes an n-word tirade as a Black 
65. “Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling” (1982) 
17 Harv CR-CLL Rev 133 at 135-36.
66. See Roberta K Timothy, “Racism Impacts Your Health” (28 February 2018), online: The 
Conversation <theconversation.com/racism-impacts-your-health-84112>; David R Williams 
& Ruth Williams-Morris, “Racism and Mental Health: The African American Experience” 
(2000) 5 Ethnicity & Health 243. 
67. See Delgado, supra note 65 at 142-43.
68. See generally Goodwin, supra note 19; Elizabeth Stordeur Pryor, “The Etymology of Nigger: 
Resistance, Language, and the Politics of Freedom in the Antebellum North” (2016) 36 J 
Early Republic 203.
69. See e.g. Goodwin, supra note 19 at 193-95. 
70. “Why it’s so hard to talk about the N-word” (14 December 2019) 
at 00h:04min:51s, online (video): Ted Talks <www.ted.com/talks/
elizabeth_stordeur_pryor_why_it_s_so_hard_to_talk_about_the_n_word>.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid at 00h:15min:13s.
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person asserting their rights or going where they please or prospering.”73 As the 
Smithers story and the stories of other Black athletes reveal, the n-word and other 
slurs are used, among other reasons, to attack and undermine the desire of Black 
athletes to engage in sports and to excel. 
A number of (former) Black athletes have commented on the impact of the 
flagrant and repeated use of racial words against them while they played hockey 
professionally or in amateur settings as youths. The ruggedness that athletes in 
rough sports are assumed and expected to possess offers no shield. For instance, 
Toronto-based lawyer and writer Anthony Morgan has written of his experience 
and reactions to being the recipient of such language at the age of ten. During a 
hockey game, Morgan had managed to bump an opposing player off the puck, 
and the individual reacted by saying, “You f*cking [ni***r]!!”74 He writes of his 
reaction in the following way: 
My heart just shattered. I stopped skating, and quickly turned around to look back 
at the player in disbelief and confusion. I could find no words and could barely 
breathe.
We were just 10 years old, but in the moment that our eyes met, I saw a meanness 
that was so overwhelmingly venomous and disempowering that I just burst into 
tears right there on the ice. This was the only response I could muster. I had never 
felt so alone, so helpless, so worthless, so hurt, so ashamed, so lost.75
Morgan’s poignant recounting of this event illustrates the devastation and sense 
of isolation that a racial insult can inflict. Various (former) Black professional 
hockey players have shared their experiences with racism while playing hockey 
as teenagers.76 Such racism did not merely emanate from rival players,77 but also 
from coaches and spectators. As former National Hockey League (NHL) player 
Georges Laraque remembers:
The kids were calling me [‘ni***r’], the coaches were calling me [‘ni***r’], the parents 
in the stands were calling me [‘ni***r’]. It was unbelievable. I cried a lot when I was 
73. Ibid at 00h:16min:23s.
74. Anthony Morgan, “Hockey was my game” (29 November 2019), online: Ricochet <ricochet.
media/en/2833/hockey-was-my-game>.
75. Ibid. 
76. See Cecil Harris, Breaking the Ice: The Black Experience in Professional Hockey 
(Insomniac Press, 2003).
77. In some cases, the racial hostility emanates from one’s own teammates. See Akim Aliu, 
“Hockey Is Not for Everyone” (19 May 2020), online: The Players’ Tribune <www.
theplayerstribune.com/en-us/articles/hockey-is-not-for-everyone-akim-aliu-nhl>.
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a kid. Not that I would cry in front of the other kids because I had a lot of ego. But 
I would go home and cry.78 
Morgan and Laraque’s experiences were not unique. 
The distressing impact of being called the n-word affects adult Black hockey 
players as well as their younger counterparts. Michael Marson was the second 
Black person to play in the NHL and was recruited by the Washington Capitols 
in 1974 when he was eighteen years old.79 Marson was born on 24 July 1955 
and was one year older than Smithers.80 Marson played in the Ontario Hockey 
League prior to joining the NHL.81 He and a fellow Black teammate, Bill Riley, 
were subjected to a continuous cacophony of racial abuse.82 Riley, who was 
Marson’s senior, commented that the constant racism and use of racial epithets 
impacted Marson greatly. Riley observed that 
in the NHL, the stuff Michael had to deal with as a kid kind of destroyed him. 
We got called every dirty name in the book, and we were getting high-sticked and 
slashed and speared on the ice. We would both fight back, but those things just cut 
Michael’s heart out.83 
African-American sportswriter and independent journalist Cecil Harris has 
written about Black men’s experiences playing in professional hockey. While 
racism was not the only theme touched upon in Harris’s book, it was a significant 
and recurring experience for many Black hockey players originating from Canada. 
Despite the successes many players may have had, Harris observes the following: 
[N]o amount of positive reinforcement can totally erase the pain of a [B]lack 
person subjected to a racial slur, particularly one uttered by someone in a position 
of authority, someone who could affect your quality of life. The slur is an attack on 
one’s personhood, an attempt to damage the psyche and wound the soul. And for a 
[B]lack in the overwhelmingly white world of hockey, no slur cuts deeper and instills 
more pain than “[ni***r].84
78. C Harris, supra note 76 at 106.
79. Ibid at 57-63; Ben Raby, “Against the Odds: Remembering Mike Marson’s Career with 
the Caps” (25 February 2019), online: Washington Capitols <www.nhl.com/capitals/news/
against-the-odds-remembering-mike-marsons-career-with-the-caps/c-305201080>. 
80. C Harris, supra note 76 at 63. 
81. Ibid at 62-63. 
82. Ibid at 65-67. 
83. Ibid at 67. 
84. Ibid at 149. 
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As Smithers posited in an interview in 1975, being called the n-word is “the most 
degrading thing anybody can call me, but I guess I’m just supposed to take it.”85 
In a more recent interview, Smithers (now in his early sixties) articulated, “I can’t 
express to you the humiliation you feel when somebody calls you those names….
You just want to hide. You just want to crawl under a table and not be seen.”86
A full accounting of the racism experienced by professional and amateur 
Black hockey players is beyond the scope of this article.87 It should be fairly well 
understood that instances of anti-Black racism are not confined to hockey or 
other sports. The purpose of this section is to identify the impact and emotional 
consequences of hurling racial slurs at young Black athletes, which will help to 
frame Smithers’s actions in response to Cobby’s racist violence—both verbal and 
physical. First, there is a particularly destructive quality to the n-word and other 
similar slurs largely reserved for Black people. Second, when these slurs are hurled 
in the context of organized sports, Black athletes sustain emotional damage. The 
use of such racist words is demeaning enough on its own; however, in the context 
of hockey, these words are also accompanied by physically violent actions. 
When Smithers was playing, he too was subjected to racist words, accompanied 
sometimes by physical violence directed his way. The impact of these racist words, 
over time, in combination with the failure of officials to respond appropriately to 
such racism, must be understood to contextualize Smithers’s resistance to these 
words. The Court failed to recognize such realities and largely erased them from 
its narrative. 
D. CONFRONTING RACISM AS AN ACT OF RESISTANCE
Though racism and its pernicious impacts have been considerable features 
throughout Canadian history and that of other nations, many people of colour 
have resisted discriminatory oppression through legal actions and, in other 
85. David DuPree, “Racial Taunts, Hockey Violence—Death is the Aftermath: Manslaughter 
Conviction Follows Death of Hockey Player,” The Washington Post (1 March 1975) C1 at C5.
86. Dave Feschuk, “The cost of words: It was almost 50 years ago when a night of slurs at the 
hockey rink led to a teenager’s death,” The Toronto Star (13 June 2020), online: <www.
thestar.com/sports/hockey/opinion/2020/06/13/the-cost-of-words-it-was-almost-50-years-
ago-when-a-night-of-slurs-at-the-hockey-rink-led-to-a-teenagers-death.html>. See also CBC 
News, “Racial slurs changed the life of Paul Smithers in 1973, but he still hopes for change” 
(12 June 2020), online (video): <www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCVJkHWsito>.
87. Though it should be noted that concerns about the continued utterance of 
racial slurs persist today in minor league hockey in Toronto. See Rick Westhead 
& Solarina Ho, “Racial slurs are common in Toronto-area minor hockey 
league, players say” (6 June 2020), online: CTV News <www.ctvnews.ca/sports/
racial-slurs-are-common-in-toronto-area-minor-hockey-league-players-say-1.4972991>.
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situations, via extra-legal means. James W. St.G. Walker asserts, “Minority 
resistance challenged the hegemony of the prevailing paradigm and revealed the 
presence of multiple historical trajectories within Canadian society.”88 He observes 
that “minority resistance did not begin with World War II”; rather, “it was 
carried frequently before the majority population in petitions and delegations to 
legislatures, newspaper campaigns, action in the workplace, and testing through 
the courts.”89 As further evidence of this, Barrington Walker has illustrated 
how Black North Americans resisted slavery, racially charged insults hurled by 
white people, and other illegitimate race-related conduct perpetrated by state 
and non-state actors.90 Backhouse has highlighted Viola Desmond’s challenge to 
racial segregation in 1940s Nova Scotia.91 Therefore, while Black Canadians are 
and have been targets of racial discrimination, James Walker posits that a broader 
social history recognizes that persons from minorities were “actively engaged, not 
as victims or objects, but as participants in the shaping of their own destinies.”92 
Though it should be noted, such resistance bore mixed results. Some fought the 
law, but the law won. 
It is in this broader socio-legal and historical context that I shall situate 
Smithers’s actions against white supremacist attitudes and behaviour, which were 
dominant in hockey at that time; this is a counter-story to the Court’s official 
narrative. Smithers’s resistance did not reveal itself as genteel opposition to the 
racism he experienced from opposing players or spectators, or to the tolerance 
of racism by officials at the time. Smithers was confrontational and justifiably 
indignant. Though he was clearly a victim of racial aggression and experienced 
its impacts, he did not suffer the racism he endured as a passive victim. Smithers 
demonstrated agency. He challenged prevailing social prescriptions, founded 
in white supremacy, that he should simply endure his abusers’ racism and 
violence. However, his resistance had certain unintended and unforeseeable 
consequences—the death of Cobby. 
E. JUDICIAL NARRATIVES AND STORYTELLING
This article is also concerned with fact construction and dissemination in the 
context of appellate decision making. During litigation, facts may be hotly 
contested. However, as Eric M. Adams contends, facts assume a “final form” 
88. J Walker, supra note 11 at 321. 
89. Ibid. 
90. B Walker, supra note 11 at 28-44. 
91. Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11 at 226-71. 
92. J Walker, supra note 11 at 322. 
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in the written decisions of appellate courts, “ossify[ing] into something beyond 
debate.”93 Apropos to this article, he posits, “In the confident prose of judges, 
facts become the incontestable history of the moments they describe.”94 
Adams’s article itself is about how certain facts concerning a Supreme Court of 
Canada case, Christie v The York Corporation (Christie),95 found their way into 
the dissenting opinion, and were patently incorrect.96 Adams argues that such 
factual errors are illuminating for many reasons, not the least of which is that 
they may serve as the main reason for divergent approaches between a majority 
and a dissenting opinion.97 Furthermore, as Christie was a case about racial 
exclusion with respect to accessing services in a tavern (during a period when 
human rights codes barring racial discrimination in the obtaining of services 
were non-existent), Adams articulates that the case and its factual errors tell 
an important historical story about how racism functioned in urban spaces in 
Canada at the time it was decided.98
Drawing from Adams, I argue that the Smithers case illuminates how, over 
time, the Court’s view of the facts of a case can become the primary point of 
reference. Contemporaneous to the trial (April–June 1974), and in the following 
years leading up to the Court’s decision (1977), newspaper reports revealed a 
broader accounting of what occurred on the evening that Cobby died, in addition 
to the factual context leading up to the fateful night. Since the Court’s decision, 
such news reports concerning the case have receded from the public’s attention 
and memory. It is likely that what most law students have learned about the 
facts in Smithers over several decades is what the Court has told us—subject to 
instructors assigning more material.99 However, as Adams enquires, what if the 
facts are wrong (or otherwise so utterly incomplete)? In the Smithers case, unlike 
Christie, there was no dissent operating on the assumption of a different set of 
facts or factual assumptions. Smithers was a unanimous judgement subscribing to 
a particular interpretation of what occurred. 
Following Adams’s example, I provide a broader history of what ensued in 
Smithers. I hope to offer a revealing look at two ways that racism functioned in the 
case. First, Smithers illustrates how racism operated and was accepted in organized 
93. Adams, supra note 11 at 464.
94. Ibid.
95. [1940] SCR 139 [Christie]. 
96. Adams, supra note 11 at 464-67. 
97. Ibid at 467-68. 
98. Ibid at 495-97.
99. For instance, I have assigned newspaper articles such as David DuPree’s 1975 article in the 
Washington Post. See DuPree, supra note 85. 
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sports at the amateur level. Second, and perhaps more alarmingly, the Court’s 
bare acknowledgement of this racism and construction of Smithers as a Black 
aggressor signifies its own complicity in legitimating this racism and advancing 
the pernicious caricature of Black males as uncontrolled savages and criminals. 
When one contemplates ideas about judicial storytelling and the selection of 
which facts comprise the official narrative, one might consider Clifford Geertz’s 
assertion that “legal facts are made not born” and are socially constructed in 
light of various considerations including the rules of evidence, law reporting 
traditions, and “the rhetoric of judges.”100 As noted earlier, Justice Brian Dickson 
authored the decision on behalf of the Court. He had a recognizable approach 
to writing decisions. In their biography of Justice Dickson, Robert J. Sharpe 
and Kent Roach observe that his opinions, for the most part, were “short and 
concise.”101 They posit that Justice Dickson was known for working very hard 
to make his judgments “as clear as possible.”102 These are laudable objectives, 
provided that a devotion to clarity, conciseness, and readability does not result 
in oversimplification, a lack of nuance, or a one-sided account that is unfair to 
a party in the case, particularly a criminal defendant. This is unfortunately what 
transpired in the Smithers case. 
Judicial fact construction and storytelling at the appellate level become 
rather complex enterprises when cases arise out of a jury trial. In non-jury trials, 
the judge, sitting as the finder of fact, provides reasons that can serve as a key 
basis for appellate review.103 Any review with respect to factual errors is assessed 
on a highly deferential standard.104 During a jury trial, the jurors determine what 
happened and apply the law as instructed by the judge.105 The jury does not 
furnish reasons.106 Even where an appellate court hears appeals from a jury trial 
on questions of law or mixed fact and law, there is a factual matrix from which 
the case emerges. How do appellate courts decide which facts matter, or even 
what happened, when there was conflicting testimony at trial? It may be prudent 
for appellate courts to at least acknowledge in their judgments that there were 
conflicting accounts given at trial but that the jury clearly or likely favoured certain 
evidence in arriving at its verdict. In other jury cases, both parties may arrive at 
100. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 1983) at 173.
101. Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for 
Canadian Legal History, 2003) at 116.
102. Ibid at 202.
103. David M Paciocco et al, The Law of Evidence, 8th (Irwin Law, 2020) at 25-26.
104. Le, supra note 10 at para 23.
105. Paciocco et al, supra note 103 at 25.
106. Ibid.
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an agreed set of facts from which an appellate court may draw when constructing 
the factual narrative. Smithers was a jury trial. There were no written findings of 
fact. While the Court was provided a broader understanding of the facts which 
gave rise to Cobby’s death and the racialized context through the appellant’s 
factum and specific references to the trial transcript, it largely disregarded them. 
For the most part, many of the factual representations in Smithers’s appellant 
factum went uncontested in the Crown’s respondent factum.107 
Time plays a central role in constructing narratives. In judicial storytelling, 
when does the narrative begin? An account of the past that looks solely at the 
transgressive act(s) constituting the criminal offence and the moments that 
preceded the offence (even assuming that the account is accurate and not unduly 
one-sided) may nevertheless be impoverished if a broader and relevant contextual 
understanding is omitted. Take, for instance, the case of an accused who immolates 
a victim while the latter is sleeping. If evidence exists and is presented that the 
accused and victim were in a one-sided violent and abusive relationship (and the 
accused was at the receiving end of this abuse), should the narrative clock begin 
only moments before the transgressive and murderous act of immolation?108 
Such a move could be detrimental to an accused. As Tanzil Z. Chowdhury 
articulates, temporality impacts “what types of facts, or specifically, what types of 
pasts are emergent in [an] adjudication’s determination of what happened.”109 
Chowdhury maintains that how we frame the past has consequences for ascribing 
legal responsibility to an accused.110 This framing is relevant with respect to 
liability, as well as sentencing and arriving at a punishment that is proportionate, 
accounting for, among other things, the offender’s moral blameworthiness.
Time’s relevance with respect to the Court’s narrative in the Smithers case is 
striking. The Court is chiefly focused on Smithers’s transgressive act, and the only 
relevant context in which it is interested is the heated nature of the game and 
Smithers’s forty-five-minute pursuit of Cobby following their ejection, both of 
which precede the consequential fight in the parking lot. Even then, it drastically 
understates the details of the racism and violence targeted at Smithers during the 
107. Smithers v The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 506 (Factum of the Respondent [Respondent’s 
Factum]) (“The Respondent accepts the facts as stated by the Appellant and draws the 
following additional facts to the attention of this Honourable Court” at para 1). Such 
additional facts were focused largely on the medical testimony and the issue of causation 
(ibid at paras 5-31).
108. See Tanzil Z Chowdhury, “Temporality and Criminal Law Adjudication’s Multiple Pasts” 
(2017) 38 Liverpool L Rev 187 at 187-88.
109. Ibid at 188 [emphasis in original].
110. Ibid.
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actual game. Furthermore, Smithers’s overall experience of racism while playing 
in the hockey league and the tolerance of said discrimination went unaddressed. 
The accumulated impact of these incidents helps to shape an understanding of 
Smithers’s conduct on the night in question. 
Having situated this article within several areas of scholarship, I next turn to 
presenting a counter-story that challenges the Court’s official narrative. 
II. PRESENTING A COUNTER-STORY
In this portion of the article, I both deconstruct the Court’s narrative and present 
a counter-story that challenges the misrepresentations of Smithers as an aggressor 
and Cobby as his victim. To recall, the Court’s concise narrative is reproduced 
in its entirety in this article’s introduction, above, and is focused exclusively on 
the events of 18 February 1973. The story builds toward Smithers and Cobby’s 
fight and its tragic result. This Part is divided into five thematic and chronological 
sections: (A) the factual context of Smithers’s experiences with racism prior to 
18 February; (B) Smithers’s and Cobby’s encounters during the hockey game 
and the racist conduct of spectators on 18 February; (C) Smithers’s and Cobby’s 
interactions after they were ejected from the game, building towards, but prior 
to, their fight outside the arena; (D) the fight leading to Cobby’s death; and (E) 
the events following Cobby’s death, which were left out of the Court’s decision.
A. EXPANDING TIME – THE RACIALIZED CONTEXT LEADING TO 
18 FEBRUARY 
The temporal center of gravity of the Court’s narrative is fixed on the events of 18 
February 1973. For the Court, what preceded that day seemed to have no bearing 
with respect to its narrative and construction of Smithers or Cobby. Drawing 
from Chowdhury’s work, mentioned in Part I(E), above, I argue that the racism 
Smithers endured leading up to 18 February gives much-needed perspective to 
his response to the discrimination that he was subjected to that day. This context 
provides insight into why Smithers elected not to let the matter drop after the 
game and opted instead to pursue Cobby and demand either an apology or a fight.
Smithers had been playing organized ice hockey since the age of eight.111 
On 18 February, both Smithers and Cobby were sixteen years old. Smithers was 
the only Black player in the midget hockey league in which he played. At trial, 
Smithers testified that during the hockey season (which commenced in September 
111. DuPree, supra note 85 at C1. 
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1972), he was the target of racial epithets from various opposing teams, parents 
of such players, and other spectators. The following is an excerpt from Smithers’s 
testimony on direct examination with his trial counsel, Arthur Maloney: 
Q [Maloney]: What is your recollection in the games that you played of reference 
being made to your race and colour?
A [Smithers]: It seemed like every game it was getting a bit more. At the beginning 
of the year they didn’t keep bothering me, as the year sort of went on it seemed to 
be getting out of hand I would have to say.
Q: What sort of things were you called?
A: [Ni***r], [c**n], things of that aspect, in relation to my colour.
Q: And this wasn’t just the Applewood Team, this was other teams, is that right? 
A: I would have to say probably most of them. I wouldn’t say all of them, but most 
of them. 
Q: Now what about, who would address you in this way?
A: Players, fans, parents, anybody that was at the rink, except for probably spectators 
that were for our team I guess.
Q: And what was this state of affairs, would you say this worsened as the season 
progressed?
A: Yes.112
These experiences were corroborated by various defence witnesses, including 
Smithers’s team’s coach, as well as certain fellow teammates and their parents. 
Although Smithers testified that most of the teams would use racist slurs 
against him, he and other defence witnesses observed that the Applewood 
(Cobby’s team) and Malton teams rivaled each other in their heightened level 
of racial aggression toward him.113 The game on 18 February was not the first 
time that Smithers and Cobby met on the ice, nor the only time that Cobby 
hurled racial insults at Smithers. On the witness stand, Smithers posited that in 
at least one previous game, Cobby “said maybe once, or twice, about – you know, 
he would call me a stupid [ni***r], something like that, I never really – you know, 
let it bother me because he wasn’t really calling me that much.”114 However, 
in one news article, a fellow Cooksville player was interviewed stating that 
“Cobby always directed racial barbs at Smithers whenever the [Applewood and 
112. Smithers v The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 506 (Trial Transcript, Vol 4 at 563-64 [Transcript]).
113. Ibid at 564. 
114. Ibid at 567. 
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Cooksville] teams met.”115 Whatever the frequency (and once was more than 
enough), the game on 18 February was not the first instance where Cobby 
projected racial epithets at Smithers. 
In providing some further context about Cobby’s deployment of racist 
language, his use of the n-word was not confined to hockey matches and may 
have been deployed casually in his social life. He apparently utilized such 
language with at least one Black friend at school. Speaking with a reporter, this 
Black friend observed, “Oh, sure, [Cobby] called me a [ni***r] and things like 
that. But it was only joking.”116 As a teenager, Cobby’s generalized but developing 
perceptions of Black people might be illustrated in a paper he wrote in school—
notably, he wrote a paper that his parents shared with reporters in the years 
following his death to demonstrate that their son was not racist and to perhaps 
burnish his reputation posthumously. In this paper, written about Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, for which Cobby earned a B-plus grade, he commented about 
the manner in which slaves were mistreated in the southern United States “and 
the racial prejudice that is still shown in this day and age of freedom.”117 Cobby 
then revealed that the book “also showed me that Negroes are human. I often 
wondered if they were any different, although I don’t think I was prejudiced.”118 
That one can learn such important lessons from studying literature is perhaps a 
testament to its power and significance, yet one would think that even teenagers 
in the early 1970s would have learned the basic idea that Black people were 
humans prior to that, perhaps from their parents. In this regard, Cobby may have 
been ill served by his upbringing. 
Leonard and Brenda Cobby gave interviews in the years following their son’s 
death. After reading one particular article from 1975, one might arrive at certain 
assumptions as to the source of Cobby’s willingness to utter racial epithets at 
Smithers. In that article, Leonard Cobby offered the following observation to 
Dan Proudfoot: 
It was as though our boy was the villain and Smithers lily-white, when actually the 
black what’s-it was a dirty hockey player and a violent person. If our boy called him a 
name, he bloody well deserved to be called it. I mean, we’re all called names at times, 
aren’t we? I mean, that’s the first thing people turn to is your origins, isn’t it? I’ve 
115. Ross Thomas Runfola, “He is a Hockey Player, 17, Black and Convicted of Manslaughter,” 
The New York Times (27 October 1974) 5-2, online: <timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1974/10/27/issue.html>. 
116. Dan Proudfoot, “The Tragedy of Barrie and Paul,” Weekend Magazine (12 July 1975) 4 at 8.
117. Ibid at 6. 
118. Ibid. 
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been called a limey what’s-it many a time. If they can’t stand the name-calling, then 
maybe they shouldn’t be permitted to be in the sport with the white people should they?119
It is worth stressing that Leonard Cobby’s comments were made within two 
years of his son’s death and may be representative only of the substantial degree 
of anger and resentment that he harboured. While they may not reflect his 
views prior to his son’s passing, it would not take a great leap of imagination 
to consider that they were indeed his longstanding perspectives and had been 
imparted to his son in some manner. Leonard Cobby’s statements represent the 
reductive ideas that shouting racial epithets at Smithers was mere name-calling 
and deserved, in Leonard Cobby’s mind, if Smithers was a “dirty” player and a 
violent person. Furthermore, if Black people cannot stand such name-calling, 
they should be excluded from playing with white people. These ideas, of course, 
signify that Leonard and Barrie Cobby failed to understand both the magnitude 
of racial epithets, including the n-word, and that their use constitutes more than 
simple name-calling. 
The discrimination directed at Smithers was also connected to his 
membership in a particular family unit—one that included his Black father 
and white mother.120 This was in an era where interracial relationships were 
likely neither prevalent nor widely accepted. A month prior to the game on 18 
February, Smithers experienced a particularly vicious encounter with players from 
the Malton team after a hockey match. As Smithers and his mother were walking 
to their car, players from the Malton team referred to her as “[ni***r] lover” 
and “white whore” or “white pig.”121 Smithers, who would normally appear to 
take in stride the epithets directed at him during games,122 angrily confronted 
their antagonists. He was restrained by his coach, George Spencer, and a ticket 
collector at the Malton arena, before a more serious altercation could occur.123 
Smithers testified that this verbal assault on his mother “probably bothered me 
119. Ibid [emphasis added]. 
120. See Patrick Scott, “Sympathy eases pain of son’s conviction,” The Toronto Star (25 April 1974) 
A3. Scott states that witnesses at the trial testified “that spectators…also taunted [Smithers] 
throughout the game because of his color and because his mother was known to be white” 
(ibid). Donald Smithers observed that in their eighteen years of marriage, they never really 
experienced “real discrimination outside a hockey arena or baseball lot” (ibid). When they 
did experience it, Donald Smithers observed, “And it’s always the adults, the other parents, 
who cause most of the trouble there” (ibid). 
121. Transcript, supra note 112 at 564-65, 634, 649; “Youth tells trial of race insults,” The Toronto 
Star (19 April 1974) A3 [“Youth tells trial”].
122. In one article, Smithers advised that “the name-calling has always hurt. He usually didn’t let 
it show.” DuPree, supra note 85 at C1.
123. Transcript, supra note 112 at 649. 
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more than being called [ni***r] myself.”124 The pain and anger prompted by this 
event persisted. In a 1975 interview, Smithers explained that after this incident 
in Malton, “he continued to feel angry and frustrated,”125 which suggests that 
these feelings carried into the match on 18 February. He observed, “I guess what 
happened at Brampton two weeks later had been building up.”126
The racism Smithers suffered on 18 February 1973 did not occur in a vacuum. 
By framing the narrative solely in connection with the events of that particular 
day, the Court disregarded important and relevant contextual information that 
gave meaning to Smithers’s actions during both the hockey game and the fight that 
followed. Omitting the context of blatant and permitted racism against Smithers 
that occurred over a period of time casts the events of 18 February as random 
moments, untethered to a pattern of discrimination perpetrated by, among 
others, Cobby and the Applewood team. However, the impact of veiling the 
context prior to 18 February is compounded by the Court’s myopic construction 
of what transpired during the hockey game and the fight afterwards. In the next 
section, I offer a counter-narrative regarding what occurred during the game. 
B. THE GAME
The Court’s parsimonious discussion of the events leading to the confrontation 
between Smithers and Cobby outside the arena are encapsulated in ten sentences. 
In the second sentence, the Court informs the readers that Cobby was sixteen 
years old. The Court omits the fact that Smithers was also sixteen years of age 
on the night in question. This emphasizes Cobby’s purported youthfulness and 
connects it to his untimely death while disregarding Smithers’s adolescence.127 
The Court also fails to understand how a sixteen-year-old Black teenager might 
react when consistently subjected to racism without any intervention.
The Court’s recapitulation of what transpired during the hockey game is also 
remarkably brief. To recall:
124. Ibid at 565.
125. Dupree, supra note 85 at C5.
126. Ibid.
127. Erasing Smithers’s status as a minor is consistent with a broader phenomenon of the 
adultification of Black youth. This involves institutional perceptions of and engagement 
with Black boys as adults. This transformation of Black boys into men and criminals 
works to “deny Black boys any access to childhood humanity.” See T Elon Dancy III, “The 
Adultification of Black Boys: What Educational Settings Can Learn from Trayvon Martin” 
in Kenneth J Fasching-Varner et al, eds, Trayvon Martin, Race, and American Justice: Writing 
Wrong (Springer, 2014) 49 at 49. 
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The game was rough, the players were aggressive and feelings ran high. The 
appellant, who is black, was subjected to racial insults by Cobby and other members 
of the Applewood team. Following a heated and abusive exchange of profanities, the 
appellant and Cobby were both ejected from the game.128 
While the Court succinctly acknowledges that Smithers was the target of racial 
insults, one might draw from this summary that both Smithers and Cobby 
engaged in equally unacceptable behaviour, which justified their simultaneous 
ejection from the game. This false moral equivalence, situated within a frugal 
reconstruction of the factual matrix, elides much. The Court’s statement that 
Smithers was “subjected to racial insults by Cobby and other members of the 
Applewood team” does not sufficiently encapsulate either the nature and volume 
of the racial violence he endured or the range of actors involved.
According to various witness accounts, including Smithers’s testimony,129 
both the Applewood and Cooksville players were aggressive from the outset. While 
this aggression was initially physical in nature, the racial invective materialized 
around the sixth or seventh minute of play.130 Around this stage of the game, 
Smithers tried to gain control of the hockey puck while in a corner near the 
Applewood team’s net. Cobby was present there too, as were other players from 
both teams.131 As the whistle was blown to stop the play, Cobby proclaimed to 
Smithers that he was going to “get” him for “that” and then called him a “dirty 
bastard” or a “black bastard.”132 Smithers did not understand the reasons for 
Cobby’s outburst.133 In the view of one Crown witness, Smithers purportedly 
speared Cobby with his hockey stick, which then prompted Cobby’s angry 
response.134 Denying that he had speared Cobby, Smithers acknowledged at trial 
that Cobby thought he had done something.135 There appears to be at least two 
other accounts that may explain what triggered Cobby’s reaction. As reported in 
The Toronto Star, in coverage contemporaneous to the trial (and specifically in 
relation to Smithers’s testimony), Cobby’s reaction was prompted by the fact that 
128. Smithers, supra note 12 at 508.
129. Transcript, supra note 112 (“it seemed like everybody was sort of playing a dirty 
game…” at 568).
130. Smithers testified that up to that point, he did not hear any racial epithets directed at him 
(ibid at 568-69). 
131. Ibid at 569.
132. Ibid. 
133. Ibid at 569-70; “Kicking of player was self-defence, accused testifies,” The Globe and Mail (19 
April 1974) 8 [“Kicking of player”].
134. Transcript, supra note 112 at 611.
135. Ibid. 
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Smithers was able to retrieve the puck from Cobby in the corner.136 No mention 
was made in the article of any other physical contact to Cobby that may have 
instigated his reaction. In a Washington Post article published in 1975, another 
account revealed, “Early in the first period a Cooksville player not Smithers, 
elbowed Cobby. Cobby immediately lashed out at Smithers, however, calling 
him ‘a dirty black bastard’ and screaming ‘I’ll get you, I’ll get you.’”137 Whichever 
version proves most accurate, nothing Smithers did, if anything, justified Cobby’s 
reaction or the racist statements that would follow minutes later. Nevertheless, 
a downward spiral ensued.
Within minutes of this confrontation, Cobby speared Smithers with his 
hockey stick, for which Cobby received a five-minute penalty.138 According to 
Smithers’s teammate, Frank Say, Cobby challenged Smithers, stating, “Don’t 
think I’m scared of you, I’ll fight you after the game.”139 As Cobby skated to 
the penalty box, he continued to holler at Smithers, “Com[e] on, let’s fight you 
stupid [ni***r].”140 At the time, Smithers was skating to his own bench to receive 
instructions from his coach. Smithers responded to Cobby by saying “okay.”141 
The referee admonished Cobby and instructed him to proceed to the penalty 
box.142 Being confined to the penalty box did nothing to quell Cobby’s volubility. 
He continued to hurl racial vituperations at Smithers, including the n-word.143 
Testimony from Crown witnesses also confirmed that, while sitting in the penalty 
box, Cobby remained in an angry and agitated state and referred to Smithers as a 
“f…ing [ni***r]” a few times.144 According to the testimony of timekeeper Nick 
Brouwer, who was sitting in the penalty box while Cobby was serving his penalty, 
Cobby referred to Smithers as “[t]hat dirty black bastard” and further declared, 
136. “Youth tells trial,” supra note 121.
137. DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
138. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570, 683; Smithers v The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 506 (Factum of 
the Appellant at para 12 [Appellant’s Factum]); “Kicking of player,” supra note 133.
139. Transcript, supra note 112 at 673. From direct and cross-examination of this witness, 
it appeared that Say was close enough to hear Cobby’s statements clearly and similarly would 
have heard Smithers’s response, if there was any. Say indicated that he did not hear any 
response from Smithers (ibid at 677-78).
140. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133.
141. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570. Reporting by David DuPree in the Washington Post 
indicates that as Cobby was on his way to the penalty box, he yelled at Smithers, threatening, 
“I’ll get you, you black m……….., I’ll get you.” DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
142. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570.
143. Ibid at 570, 612. During cross-examination, Smithers was asked what Cobby was saying to 
him. Smithers responded, “To the reference of the colour, like what I said, [ni***r], [c**n] 
and stuff like this” (ibid at 612).
144. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 14.
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“I’m fucking going to get him.”145 One can safely conclude from these accounts 
that Cobby engaged in overt racism, physical violence, and open exhortations to 
fight after the game. Notably, Smithers chose not to respond violently—despite 
Cobby’s racially provocative language—and instead focused on the game.
With the Applewood team’s star player serving a five-minute penalty for 
spearing, Smithers took advantage of the power play and scored a goal. After 
scoring, Smithers skated by the penalty box on the way to his own bench. 
As he did so, Cobby launched into a renewed series of racial slurs, with other 
Applewood players following his lead.146 Smithers elaborated that these words 
included “[f ]…ing [ni***r], stupid [ni***r], [c**n], things like that.”147 Smithers 
responded to Cobby with “that will show you.”148 The timekeeper testified that he 
heard Smithers utter something to the effect of “[h]a, we got a goal. Showed you 
up.”149 Unhinged, Cobby continued to unleash a torrent of racial expletives.150 
Smithers recollected that after he reached his bench, Cobby was still yelling 
at him from the penalty box.151 Referee Thomas Drew then warned Cobby to 
stop and, when he refused, expelled him from the game.152 Drew then skated to 
Smithers and similarly ejected him from the game, seemingly for engaging in an 
exchange of profanities.153 According to Drew, who testified as a Crown witness, 
after Smithers scored his goal and made the comment referenced above to Cobby, 
there was an exchange of words between the two players.154 With respect to Drew’s 
observational skills, it is notable that, on cross-examination, he testified that he 
145. Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 6. In reporting by The Globe and Mail contemporaneous with 
the trial, it was reported that Michael Vukobrat, a coach of the Applewood Juvenile hockey 
team, stated that Cobby told him, while in the penalty box, that he was “going to get that 
‘dirty black bastard.’” “Racial taunts in hockey game ended in fight, witness says,” The Globe 
and Mail (10 April 1974) 9 [“Racial Taunts in Hockey Game”]. This reference to Vukobrat 
may have been an error. It would seem more logical that Nick Brouwer, as a timekeeper, 
would have been present, rather than a coach from Cobby’s team. In either event, there is 
consistency between the different reporting of this incident insofar as to what Cobby said in 
reference to Smithers.
146. In an interview with The Washington Post, Smithers indicated that Applewood players chanted 
“get the [ni***r]…get the [ni***r].” DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
147. Transcript, supra note 112 at 571. 
148. Ibid.
149. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 15.
150. Transcript, supra note 112 at 571, 613-14.
151. Ibid at 571.
152. Ibid. 
153. Ibid at 572, 614. 
154. “Boy expected trouble, manslaughter trial told,” The Globe and Mail (9 April 1974) 8 [“Boy 
expected trouble”]. 
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had not heard Smithers being called the n-word or other racial slurs.155 This is 
striking, given that Cobby had uttered these words repeatedly and forcefully. 
Applewood manager John Lockey testified, “I heard ‘[ni***r]’ and other remarks 
with racial overtones and Smithers was retaliating and using the term ‘whitey.’”156 
Applewood coach John Beaune also testified that he heard slurs coming from not 
only Cobby but also other players from his team.157 The Applewood players did 
not appear to suffer any repercussions for employing such language, apart from 
Beaune admonishing them to stop the “name-calling” and focus on the game.158 
The racialized nature of what transpired before Smithers and Cobby were 
ejected from the game was not limited to the players. Testimony at trial conveyed 
that spectators also vocally contributed to the racism aimed at Smithers, who 
heard their abusive language.159 Speaking more generally, Smithers testified that 
those who hurled racist slurs at him included opposing “players, fans, parents, 
anybody that was at the rink,” with the probable exception of those who 
supported the Cooksville team.160 Smithers posited that this behaviour worsened 
as the season progressed.161 Such spectator participation was observed by others. 
Smithers’s teammate, goalie Rick Bailey, asserted that while he often heard racial 
slurs during past games, it was excessive on the night of 18 February. He explained 
that there was “no way you could help but hear it. Players on the ice and people 
in the stands were calling Paul a black bastard and stuff like that.”162
The utterance of racial slurs would also be accompanied by ominous 
suggestions of violence. Smithers testified that some spectators were shouting 
at the Applewood players, encouraging them to “get that [ni***r],” or words to 
that effect.163 Other defence witnesses corroborated such spectator misconduct. 
Alfred Bartlett, a parent of one of Smithers’s teammates, was present in the stands 
the evening of 18 February.164 He witnessed others among his age group (he was 
155. Ibid.
156. “Racial Taunts in Hockey Game,” supra note 145. 
157. Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 6. 
158. Ibid.
159. In an article published after the jury’s verdict (but prior to sentencing), Joyce and Donald 
Smithers both conveyed their bitterness “about the large number of adults—coaches, game 
officials and especially spectators, parents of the other players—without whose acquiescence 
and even vocal encouragement they feel the tragic incident would not have occurred.” Scott, 
supra note 120. 
160. Transcript, supra note 112 at 563-64.
161. Ibid at 564.
162. DuPree, supra note 85 at C5. 
163. Transcript, supra note 112 at 591.
164. Ibid at 632.
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46 at the time of his testimony) refer to Smithers as a “black bastard” and yell out 
statements to “get the black bastard” (and possibly other epithets).165 Far from an 
isolated incident, Bartlett observed that this was common when he would attend 
games in which Smithers was playing.166 Two other defence witnesses, Lorne and 
Lorraine Bailey (a married couple and parents of a Cooksville player), took note 
of similar behaviour by younger persons.167 Lorne Bailey recalled that there were 
“a number of very profane racial comments made by some of the spectators,” 
who counselled Applewood players to “get that black bastard.”168 Lorraine Bailey 
testified that she overheard teenaged spectators calling Smithers “a black bastard” 
and the n-word.169 Both witnesses also overheard some discussion after the game, 
among those sitting in front of them, about “getting” Smithers. This suggested 
a physical assault, though it was unlikely Smithers would have been able to 
hear the threats.170
Before proceeding to the next section, I offer a few observations. The 
flagrant, aggravating, and permitted instances of racism directed at Smithers by 
Cobby, his teammates, and various spectators provide more than ample context 
to comprehend Smithers’s determination to confront Cobby and pre-empt 
future racist aggression. To recall an earlier discussion in this article, Smithers’s 
experiences on 18 February and in earlier games resemble those of other Black 
Canadian hockey players, who were equally subjected to racism from rival 
teammates, coaches, and spectators during the 1970s and afterwards. Smithers’s 
ordeals were part of a common pattern of behaviour. The Court’s understating of 
this broader course of conduct—racial epithets combined with physical violence, 
Cobby’s challenges to fight, and further calls to perpetrate violence against 
Smithers—behind a feeble acknowledgment that Smithers was subjected to racial 
insults was quite simply intentional and condemnable. Notably, the Crown did 
not dispute the racialized nature of the hockey game in its factum.171
In providing a broader account, following critical race scholarship, I have 
sought to expose, in some small measure, the lived experience of Smithers 
during the 18 February game and, in smaller measure, events prior to that day. 
By intentionally excluding this context, the Court fostered and reinforced a white 
165. Ibid at 632, 635-36; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133. 
166. Transcript, supra note 112 at 635. 
167. Ibid at 589, 690, 695-97.
168. Ibid at 690. 
169. Ibid at 696-97. 
170. Ibid at 690, 697 
171. Respondent’s Factum, supra note 107.
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supremacist caricature of Smithers as a Black “aggressor” with inherent anger 
management issues.
Smithers’s treatment prior to and during the game establishes important 
context that provides some insight into the events that followed, which led to the 
physical confrontation with Cobby outside the arena. The next section examines 
what transpired after Smithers and Cobby were ejected from the game. 
C. CHASING COBBY? – SEEKING AN APOLOGY OR SEEKING A FIGHT
At this stage of its narrative, the Court explained that after being ejected from 
the game, Smithers assumed the role of the “aggressor” for the next forty-five 
minutes, which culminated in the fight outside the arena and Cobby’s death. 
This resembles the Crown prosecutors’ characterization of Smithers as a “hunter 
stalking his prey.”172 Readers are to believe that Cobby suddenly transmogrified 
into the hunted, given his purported apprehensiveness to fight and despite his 
repeated shows of bravado, entreaties to fight, and racially provocative words 
during the game—facts that were excluded from the Court’s narrative. The 
counter-story below illustrates that, while Smithers was certainly persistent in 
confronting Cobby about the latter’s challenges to fight, labelling Smithers an 
“aggressor” misrepresents a more complicated picture. This is especially the case 
since, according to his own testimony, Smithers sought an apology from Cobby, 
which would have ended the matter. However, it is clear that if he did not receive 
an apology, Smithers was prepared to fight in the hope that, whatever the outcome, 
he would earn the respect of his detractors and the racial slurs might cease.173 
Rather than an aggressive move, Smithers’s readiness to fight could be understood 
as defensive and pre-emptive, in light of his overall experiences of racism while 
playing Cobby’s and other teams. While Cobby’s willingness to fight may have 
diminished after being ejected from the game, he neither hesitated to act in a 
dismissive manner toward Smithers nor indicated any fear or apprehensiveness 
while in Smithers’s presence.
172. “Youth, 17, guilty in hockey game fight death,” The Toronto Star (23 April 1974) A3 
[“Youth, 17, guilty”].
173. Transcript, supra note 112 at 602-604. However naive it might seem to harbour such 
hope, others who grew up during this period and experienced racism took to fighting 
their tormentors as a way to stem further attacks. See Shree Paradkar, “As a Black student, 
he was told to dream small. He had hoped things would change for his son,” The Toronto 
Star (6 September 2019), online: <www.thestar.com/news/atkinsonseries/2019/09/06/
as-a-black-student-he-was-told-to-dream-small-but-he-hoped-things-would-change-
for-his-son.html>.
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Soon after Smithers and Cobby were ejected from the game, they had a 
brief encounter near their respective teams’ dressing rooms. Smithers asked 
Cobby whether he still wanted to fight, and said that if so, they should meet 
out in the hall in ten minutes.174 Cobby flippantly responded with words to the 
effect of “[y]ou shake me up.”175 One of Cobby’s friends provided corroborating 
testimony that this encounter transpired and that he was left with the impression 
that Cobby was trying to show off to everyone present that he was not afraid 
of Smithers.176 After retiring to their dressing rooms, Smithers quickly changed 
and then waited outside the Applewood team’s dressing room.177 When the 
Applewood team’s manager, John Lockey, exited the room, Smithers asked him if 
Cobby still wanted to fight. Lockey advised Smithers to leave and mind his own 
business. Smithers refused, responding resolutely, “No, because I want to get this 
thing straightened out, I’m not going to take it anymore.”178 Though it would 
not necessarily be clear from these words, Smithers testified that he wanted an 
apology from Cobby for his conduct and, if Cobby was not prepared to give it, 
Smithers was prepared to fight him.179 Lockey observed Smithers saying, “I’m 
going to get him.”180 The door to the Applewood dressing room remained ajar, 
and Smithers and Cobby were able to make eye contact. Cobby merely sneered 
at him.181 Alan Hay, a rink attendant, advised Smithers that if he wanted to 
fight, it would have to be outside. At trial, Hay posited that as Smithers walked 
away he stated, “Well, I’m going to get him, I’m not going to hurt him, I’m 
going to kill him.”182 On cross-examination, Hay clarified that he did not take 
Smithers’s words seriously.183 Given the relatively short time that had passed 
since being ejected from the game and being the recipient of Cobby’s numerous 
174. “Kicking of player,” supra note 133 at 8.
175. Transcript, supra note 112 at 573; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133; Proudfoot, 
supra note 116 at 6.
176. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 19.
177. Transcript, supra note 112 at 574. 
178. Ibid; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133.
179. Transcript, supra note 112 at 574; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133; “Youth tells trial,” 
supra note 121. 
180. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 20. The Globe and Mail quotes Lockey as 
testifying that Smithers uttered, “I’ve had enough of this. I’m going to get you. I’m going 
to get you.” However, it is not clear from the article at what point on the night of the game 
Lockey was indicating that this occurred. “Racial Taunts in Hockey Game,” supra note 145.
181. Transcript, supra note 112 at 575.
182. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 21.
183. Ibid at para 22; Proudfoot, supra note 116 (Hay stated in cross examination, “It’s not a threat 
you actually take for his word” at 7).
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racial slurs and challenges to fight, it is hardly surprising that Smithers was still 
extremely upset. When Crown prosecutor Leo McGuigan confronted Smithers 
with evidence of his statements to Hay regarding Cobby, Smithers asserted that 
he did not recall saying these words but estimated that he was still upset at the 
time over what had recently transpired.184 
After several minutes, Cobby had changed into his street clothes and exited 
the dressing room with two friends to head to the rink area.185 Smithers, who 
appears to have been close by, followed behind, once again inquiring if Cobby 
wanted to fight. Cobby replied with “[s]hut up” or words to that effect.186 Cobby 
and his friends then situated themselves near the Applewood team’s bench, 
while Smithers placed himself elsewhere. Smithers and Cobby were still within 
viewing distance of one another and continued to exchange sneers.187 Given 
his anger over being thrown out of the game, Smithers also started to quarrel 
with, and allegedly directed abusive language at, Thomas Drew, the referee who 
had removed him from the game.188 Drew responded by threatening to suspend 
Smithers for the rest of the season.189 Undaunted, Smithers persisted with his 
vituperative commentary and Drew ended the game.190 As the teams exited the 
rink and proceeded to their respective dressing rooms, Smithers followed Cobby 
and the Applewood team. Smithers once again asked Cobby if the latter wanted 
to fight. As before, Cobby merely told Smithers to “shut up.”191 One of Cobby’s 
teammates then warned Smithers, “You had better shut up stupid [ni***r] or he 
will have to beat you.”192 
Once Cobby and the Applewood team returned to their dressing room, 
Smithers waited outside for roughly ten seconds to see if Cobby would emerge.193 
He then returned to his team’s dressing room to speak with his teammates. When 
asked if he was going to fight Cobby, Smithers explained that he was prepared to 
if Cobby wanted to do so.194 When it was suggested to Smithers that he should 
wait, so that his teammates could join him, Smithers responded, “If I’m going to 
184. Transcript, supra note 112 at 604-605; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133. 
185. Transcript, supra note 112 at 575.
186. Ibid.
187. Ibid at 576.
188. “Boy expected trouble,” supra note 154; Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 6.
189. Ibid.
190. Ibid.
191. Transcript, supra note 112 at 576.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid at 578.
194. Ibid.
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fight, I’ll fight him myself.”195 Soon after this, someone alerted Smithers that the 
Applewood team was leaving their dressing room.
As Smithers exited his team’s dressing room, he followed behind Cobby and 
other members of the Applewood team as they ascended a staircase on their way 
to leave the building. Smithers stated to Cobby, “Apologize and we will forget 
the whole thing.”196 Cobby looked back at Smithers in amazement and then 
proclaimed, “Ha, me apologize to you.”197 Given Cobby’s consistently derisive and 
racist attitude toward Smithers, it could hardly be surprising that an apology was 
not forthcoming, especially with Cobby’s friends and teammates within earshot. 
It is worth noting that none of the other Applewood players, who testified as 
Crown witnesses, seemed to have heard either Smithers’s request for an apology 
or Cobby’s refusal to give one.198 During his testimony, Smithers asserted that 
Cobby’s response was “loud enough that I would have thought that anybody who 
was around there would have heard it, but evidently I guess they didn’t.”199 Not 
surprisingly, this would suggest that someone was not telling the truth. While 
that person could have been Smithers, it could also have easily been an individual 
who engaged in racism against him or, at the very least, neither stopped nor 
openly admonished Cobby for doing so.200 From their perspective, Smithers 
unjustifiably killed their friend for nothing more than engaging in insulting 
language—language which they likely viewed as part and parcel of the game. 
The counter-story I have presented in this section, drawn largely from 
Smithers’s testimony, problematizes two aspects of the Court’s narrative: its 
195. Ibid at 583.
196. Ibid at 584-85.
197. Ibid at 585; Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 7. In The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the trial 
and, in particular, Smithers’s testimony regarding Cobby’s response to his request for an 
apology, one article quotes Smithers as recollecting, “Huh? Me apologize to you?” See 
“Kicking of player,” supra note 133. Contextually, The Globe and Mail’s phrasing strikes one 
as being possibly more accurate as to how the statement was framed and expressed during 
Smithers’s testimony.
198. One might add here that Cobby’s friends, who testified for the Crown, also constructed a 
particular image of Cobby distinct from the behaviour he exhibited to Smithers. Smithers’s 
trial counsel, Arthur Maloney, alerted to the jury in his opening statements, “His friends, 
I think perhaps unfairly to Barrie Cobby, have left a picture of a cowering frightened boy.” 
Transcript, supra note 112 at 558.
199. Ibid at 585.
200. Lorraine Bailey was given a summons to appear on behalf of the Crown and sat with other 
potential Crown witnesses in a room. She observed that Cobby’s friends, who also testified 
on behalf of the Crown, viewed the court case as a game. Bailey posited, “It was still a game 
for them, they had a great time going over their stories, over everything they testified.” 
Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 7.
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characterization of Smithers as an aggressor and Cobby’s apprehension about 
fighting. In addition to seeking an apology, Smithers inquired several times of 
Cobby whether he still wanted to fight in light of Cobby’s many challenges. 
Notably, during the encounters described in this section, Smithers did not 
initiate an assault on Cobby. In addition, there are some doubts as to whether 
Cobby was truly apprehensive. The factual record is equivocal. While Cobby 
seemed to have resiled from his earlier challenges to fight Smithers after the game, 
he still maintained a rather dismissive posture and did not appear to exhibit any 
fear when in Smithers’ presence. That said, Cobby remained consistently within 
proximity of his teammates while Smithers refused to involve his own teammates. 
It was also apparent to Smithers that Cobby was unprepared to apologize for his 
racist conduct earlier. The next section presents a counter-story regarding the 
fight outside the arena. 
D. THE FIGHT
The Court’s account of the fight and the moments leading up to it indicate 
that Cobby was apprehensive about fighting Smithers and exited the arena in a 
hurried manner to a waiting car. Indeed, after Smithers’s unsuccessful attempt to 
secure an apology earlier, he followed Cobby and his friends outside the arena.201 
Cobby had already descended the staircase when Smithers exited.202 While some 
testimony suggested that Cobby was hurrying away to escape from Smithers, 
at least three Crown witnesses observed that Cobby merely walked down the 
stairs.203 One of these witnesses even testified that Cobby “was taking his time 
walking downstairs.”204 This conflicting testimony establishes that it was less than 
evident that Cobby was hurrying to an awaiting car to avoid Smithers. 
Soon after Smithers exited the building, the Applewood team manager, John 
Lockey, briefly restrained Smithers by grabbing his arms from behind.205 However, 
Lockey then relinquished his hold and Smithers proceeded down the staircase.206 
What transpired after proceeded very rapidly. According to the Court, “[t]he 
appellant caught up with [Cobby] at the bottom of the outside steps and directed 
one or two punches to Cobby’s head.”207 Nothing is said about Cobby’s posture 
201. Transcript, supra note 112 at 585.
202. Ibid.
203. Respondent’s Factum, supra note 107 at paras 35, 38-39.
204. Ibid at para 38.
205. Transcript, supra note 112 at 585.
206. Ibid at 585-86. One Crown witness also testified that Lockey and others let Smithers go. 
Respondent’s Factum, supra note 107 at para 39.
207. Smithers, supra note 12 at 508.
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or the forcefulness of the punches—neither is insignificant. Drawing from 
Smithers’s testimony, as he approached, he observed that Cobby’s arms were raised 
and positioned at a ninety-degree angle.208 Perceiving that Cobby was prepared to 
strike him,209 Smithers threw a punch, but merely grazed Cobby’s chin.210
After striking Cobby’s face, Smithers was almost immediately and aggressively 
restrained by Cobby’s friends or teammates.211 To recall the Court’s account, 
“[s]everal of Cobby’s team mates grabbed the appellant and held him.”212 
Missing in this statement is the dangerously aggressive nature of the restraint, 
which would likely affect the forcefulness of the kick Smithers later delivered. 
One of the individuals who restrained Smithers, Richard Link, was positioned 
behind Smithers, grabbed him aggressively around his neck, and pulled back 
with force.213 Meanwhile, at least two others, Bruce Rowbotham and James 
Cooper, grabbed Smithers’s arms.214 Smithers testified that his head was tilted 
back because Link “had a pretty tight grip on my neck”215 and was pulling “fairly 
hard.”216 Smithers further explained, with respect to Link’s hold, “Like he wasn’t 
exactly choking me, he had a firm enough grip if I moved, you know, he probably 
would have been choking me.”217 On cross-examination, Smithers posited that 
208. Transcript, supra note 112 at 586, 626 (“[Cobby] had his hands up at the same angle as he 
did when he was ready to punch, I can’t recall they may have been closed, or they may have 
been open, but they were up as if he was going to strike me” at 626).
209. “Kicking of player,” supra note 133 (reporting that Smithers testified, “I thought he was 
ready to hit me, so I punched him. I punched him more or less instinctively”).
210. Transcript, supra note 112 at 586, 625.
211. Ibid at 586-87; Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 33; DuPree, supra note 85 at C5; 
Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 7. According to an article published in The Globe and Mail 
during the trial, Applewood coach, John Beaune testified that he was present and intervened 
during this altercation. Beaune stated that Smithers had one hand on Cobby’s jacket and as 
Beaune attempted to pull Smithers’s hand away, Smithers then kicked Cobby. “Boy expected 
trouble,” supra note 154. This particular version of events was neither accounted for in the 
Court’s decision, the parties’ factums, nor in Smithers’s testimony. Indeed, it seems strikingly 
inconsistent with even the Court’s official narrative of Smithers delivering the kick while 
being held back by Cobby’s teammates, as well as when Cobby was already doubled over a 
few feet away. 
212. Smithers, supra note 12 at 508.
213. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 34; Transcript, supra note 112 at 587; DuPree, 
supra note 85 at C5. 
214. Ibid; Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 34; Transcript, supra note 112 at 587.
215. Ibid at 587. 
216. Ibid at 588.
217. Ibid.
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the force Link applied to his neck indeed hurt him physically.218 Accordingly, this 
was hardly a simple and relatively benign act of grabbing and holding Smithers, 
as the Court presented. Rather, it was an overtly aggressive action—one which 
could potentially restrict the restrained person’s ability to breathe properly. 
We have now reached the critical stage of the narrative where Smithers 
delivered a kick to Cobby’s stomach area. To recall, the Court explained, 
“While Cobby was thus bent over, and approximately two to four feet from 
the appellant, the appellant delivered what was described as a hard, fast kick to 
Cobby’s stomach area.”219 Notably, from this official version, Cobby is clearly 
portrayed as a victim who was kicked while in a vulnerable or defensive state; 
that is, he was bent over. By contrast, Smithers’s account reveals a role inversion. 
With respect to Cobby’s posture at the time of the kick, Smithers testified 
during cross-examination, “When they were all holding me, [Cobby] sort of 
turned around and started coming towards me sir, like in a manner that he was 
ready to hit me, or something, hit me or kick me, or whatever sir.”220 On this 
reading, Cobby was prepared to opportunistically and cowardly assault Smithers 
while Smithers was in a compromised position and his head was being forcibly 
pulled back by Link. 
Feeding into the Court’s perception of Cobby as the victim, and Smithers as 
the unmitigated aggressor, is the characterization of the kick delivered—“a hard, 
fast kick to Cobby’s stomach area.”221 However, the forcefulness of the kick was 
in dispute at trial. Indeed, the aggressive nature of Smithers’s restraint provides 
important contextual information. It is indeed questionable just how potent 
Smithers’s kick might have been while he was being forcibly pulled back in the 
position described in his testimony. At trial, Smithers himself posited confidently 
that his kick was in fact not forceful.222 When Smithers was cross-examined by 
Crown prosecutor Leo McGuigan about how he was so positive that the kick was 
not delivered with great force, he responded, “If you are hitting something solid 
you can sort of just tell, it felt like it was a very light kick. I know it was a light 
kick, I know, I could just tell.”223 In addition, others testified that Smithers was 
heard expressing this similar reflection about the weakness of the kick soon after 
218. Ibid at 628 (“Well the guy that had me around the neck sort of hurt my neck a bit, but 
nothing serious”). 
219. Smithers, supra note 12 at 507-08.
220. Transcript, supra note 112 at 625.
221. Smithers, supra note 12 at 508-09.
222. Transcript, supra note 112 at 630. 
223. Ibid.
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the incident.224 In other words, Smithers’s recollection of the feebleness of his 
kick was not manifested solely at the trial. Furthermore, the strength of Smithers’s 
kick was also placed in doubt by a Crown witness who was present during the 
fight.225 According to this witness’s testimony, Smithers’s right leg came up as a 
result of being pulled back and losing his balance.226 The witness further observed 
that Smithers’s leg did not come up to the kicking point due to the struggle.227 
Together, such evidence impugns the singular notion that Smithers delivered a 
hard, swift kick to a purportedly vulnerable Cobby. Indeed, the leg movement 
that the Court characterized as a kick appears to be scarcely voluntary—that is, 
an act that “resulted from the choice of a conscious mind and an autonomous 
will”—if voluntary at all.228
E. AFTER THE FIGHT
After documenting the fight and Cobby’s death,229 the Court moved swiftly to 
the medical testimony. In this section, I present an account of what took place 
following the kick, which incorporates the seeming reluctance of many, including 
Cobby’s friends and teammates, to provide assistance to Cobby. The following 
counter-narrative also offers an indication of Smithers’s confused and distraught 
reaction to what had just occurred, as well as the impact of being the target of 
repeated racial slurs.
Soon after the kick, Cobby fell to the ground and was seen gasping for 
air.230 As was later testified through medical testimony, Cobby passed away 
after asphyxiating on his own vomit, which passed into his trachea due to a 
malfunctioning epiglottis.231 One defence witness, Alfred Bartlett, posited that 
while Cobby was laying on the ground struggling to breathe, there seemed to be 
little effort by his friends, teammates, or other adults present, either to assist him 
224. Ibid at 675, 691-92, 698.
225. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 36. 
226. Ibid.
227. Ibid.
228. R v Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24 at para 34. 
229. Smithers, supra note 12 at 509. The Court stated, “Following the kick, Cobby groaned, 
staggered towards his car, fell to the ground on his back, and gasped for air. Within five 
minutes he appeared to stop breathing. He was dead upon arrival at the Mississauga 
General Hospital.” 
230. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 41; Transcript, supra note 112 at 639.
231. Smithers, supra note 12 at 509. 
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or to call for medical assistance.232 Bartlett explained that he arrived after the fight 
and observed Cobby lying on the ground gasping for breath.233 
When Bartlett approached Cobby to provide assistance, he remarked to the 
Applewood players present, “I hope you are proud of yourselves what happened 
here [sic].”234 They responded by telling him to “[f ]… off” and to “leave [Cobby] 
alone.”235 Bartlett refused, telling them, “This boy is hurt and he needs help.”236 
Indeed, after being admonished by Smithers’s coach, George Spencer, to not 
get involved, Bartlett reiterated that “[t]his boy is hurt and hurt bad.”237 After 
calling over to another adult bystander to assist him, Bartlett proceeded to pump 
Cobby’s chest while the other individual attempted to provide mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation.238 Bartlett directed Cobby’s teammates to place their jackets over 
Cobby to keep him warm. Bartlett asked these teenagers whether they had called 
for an ambulance, to which they responded, “[n]o.”239 He instructed one or more 
of them to go inside and call for one and for the police. Soon after, Bartlett 
noticed that Cobby had stopped breathing and that he could not feel a pulse.240 
On cross-examination, Bartlett’s account regarding his assistance to Cobby 
and the failure of Cobby’s teammates to provide much aid was not seriously 
challenged, but for a very brief exchange. Crown prosecutor Leo McGuigan 
asked, “If I understand your evidence, you got in your car, you started it up, 
drove it up, got out and you were really the first one who gave any assistance 
or help?”241 Bartlett replied that this was correct.242 McGuigan inquired, “That’s 
your evidence?” Bartlett responded, “That’s my evidence.” McGuigan concluded, 
“Fine, thank you.”243 While one could infer that McGuigan was expressing 
incredulity about Bartlett’s testimony, he did not refer to the testimony of 
any Crown witnesses to contradict Bartlett’s account, something he did when 
cross-examining and challenging the accounts of other witnesses, such as Smithers.
232. Transcript, supra note 112 at 639, 647.
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Meanwhile, after Cobby collapsed, Smithers returned to the inside of the 
arena and remained with Lorne and Lorraine Bailey. He did not flee the scene. 
Given the violent way that he was restrained and the nature of the kick as he 
recalled it, Smithers appeared to be bewildered as to how the kick could have 
resulted in hurting Cobby. As Smithers stood with the Baileys, one of Cobby’s 
teammates uttered to him, “I hope you are satisfied you black bastard he is 
hurt.”244 Smithers then expressed to the Baileys, “I couldn’t have hit him that 
hard, I just don’t believe I could have hurt him.”245
Soon after the call was placed for medical assistance, Police Constable 
James Vanhaverbeke arrived on the scene. He could detect no signs of a pulse or 
respiration from Cobby.246 After entering the arena, he walked toward Smithers. 
Vanhaverbeke testified that as he approached Smithers, the latter stated, “I’m 
the one you want. Can I call my parents, I don’t want to say anything until 
I talk to my parents.”247 As Vanhaverbeke escorted Smithers to his police 
cruiser, he heard Smithers repeatedly say, “I didn’t kick him that hard.”248 
On cross-examination, Vanhaverbeke acknowledged that Smithers was “sobbing 
and highly distraught.”249 Salient to the impact of the repeated racial insults to 
which Smithers was subjected, Vanhaverbeke also testified that on their walk to 
the police cruiser, Smithers asserted, “He called me [ni***r], every game, I’m sick 
of it, that’s all I got [ni***r], [ni***r].”250 Smithers also opined to Vanhaverbeke 
that “the fight was started on the ice, and it had started a long time ago.”251 
Vanhaverbeke placed Smithers in his police car. Detective Sergeant Barry King 
arrived at the scene soon after. After learning of Cobby’s death, he approached 
Vanhaverbeke’s cruiser and observed Smithers sitting in the car with “his head 
down toward his knees” and crying.252 After informing Smithers that Cobby had 
died, he noticed Smithers further break down and cry.253 
The Court’s portrayal of Smithers as an aggressor, as opposed to a victim 
of racial violence who demonstrated both agency and suffering, advances a 
white supremacist narrative. Its narrative denies recognition of Smithers’s 
244. Transcript, supra note 112 at 691.
245. Ibid at 692, 698.
246. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 45.
247. Ibid at para 46. 
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252. Ibid at para 48. 
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humanity, including the impact of racist and threatening conduct towards him, 
his appreciation that Cobby was injured, and his reaction when he learned of 
Cobby’s death. 
Through this entire counter-story, we learn about the significant impact that 
racism had on Smithers. I have offered a version of events that was largely kept 
out of the Court’s reductive narrative and its characterization of Smithers: A Black 
aggressor preying on his white teenage victim. Given the evidence available 
to the Court through the trial transcript, along with pointed references to the 
evidence by Smithers’s appellate counsel William McMurtry in both written 
and oral submissions,254 the Court’s one-sided narration and characterization 
cannot be seen as anything but deliberate and intentional. The Court opted to 
project a particularly misleading story and representation of Smithers, despite the 
complexity offered in the record.
The Court’s narrative of the events is not the only problematic feature of 
the case. A broader reading of the case history also points to concerns about the 
prosecution’s efforts during the trial to minimize Smithers’s experiences of racism 
while playing hockey and the role that racism played in jury deliberations. I turn 
to these issues next.
III. MINIMIZING RACISM
Thus far, I have focused most of my attention on providing a counter-narrative 
to the Court’s decision by emphasizing the role that race played. However, the 
Court is not the only actor that minimized the significance of racism in the case. 
In this Part, I examine primarily the Crown prosecutors’ role in diminishing the 
importance of race and the moral culpability of those who engaged in racism 
against Smithers. Such minimization ties into a larger social expectation that 
Smithers endure the racialized verbal and physical assaults, both on and off the 
ice, and not respond violently. 
During litigation, notwithstanding the clear evidence of racist slurs being 
projected at Smithers, Crown prosecutors made distinct efforts to undermine the 
role of racism and its impact. When prosecutor Leo McGuigan cross-examined 
Smithers, he asserted that he did not condone racism.255 Yet during his closing 
arguments, McGuigan sought to dismiss the racial animus inherent in statements 
254. See Mary Trueman, “Justices cool to points in racial slaying appeal,” The Globe and Mail 
(11 February 1977) 9. William McMurtry replaced his brother Roy McMurtry as Smithers’s 
counsel before the Court.
255. Transcript, supra note 112 at 599. 
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expressed by both Applewood players and spectators. He conveyed that such 
expressions were made in the heat of the moment and did not demonstrate that 
such persons were prejudiced, “otherwise Applewood would not be a good place 
to live in.”256 This illustrates a problematic commitment to rehabilitating racists 
and protecting discriminatory language by obscuring the obvious racial hatred 
and violence behind the words. McGuigan’s statements suggest a special degree 
of deliberate ignorance to the frequency and level of racial hostility directed at 
Smithers during both the game on 18 February and prior matches. It is exactly 
this type of underlying tolerance of racism that allowed Cobby, his teammates, 
and spectators to feel empowered to bully and racially abuse Smithers in a manner 
that was clearly threatening and intimidating. 
The prosecution’s efforts to downplay the racism directed at Smithers was 
also exemplified in comments made by McGuigan’s co-counsel John Greenwood, 
who seemed critical of the attention given to the case because of Smithers’s race. 
In a literal appeal to colour blindness regarding a case about racial discrimination, 
Greenwood observed, “If you take away Smithers’ color, there wouldn’t be so 
much attention given this case [sic].”257 In addition, Greenwood offered that “[i]f 
Smithers were white…[t]here probably wouldn’t be so much public concern. 
He probably would have been convicted and that would have been that.”258 This 
was strikingly obtuse. The likely reasons that the case received such attention 
(including international coverage in The New York Times and The Washington 
Post) were the degree of racism Smithers experienced because he was Black and the 
fact that he fought back against it. Furthermore, but for the discrimination and 
repeated racial slurs directed at Smithers, there would have been no reason for 
him to confront Cobby after the game.
While unable to sweep such blatant racism under the rug, the prosecution 
argued that Smithers was largely unaffected by these racist slurs, as he was 
accustomed and conditioned to hearing such words thrusted at him. McGuigan 
questioned Smithers about whether he was conditioned to hearing racist terms 
directed at him. Smithers responded, “I get conditioned to a certain amount of 
it, but that was an excess amount of it that I received that night.”259 McGuigan 
then inquired if “in the course of the heat of a hockey game things are said from 
one player to another in which it means no more than the fact that it’s said 
256. “Youth, 17, guilty,” supra note 172.
257. DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
258. Ibid.
259. Transcript, supra note 112 at 631.
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in the part of the hockey game?”260 In response, Smithers acknowledged that 
“certainly a lot of things do get said in a hockey game, but there’s no reason for 
the fact for him calling me as continuously as he did, it was more than obvious 
that it wasn’t just in the heat of the hockey game as far as I am concerned sir.”261 
McGuigan suggested to Smithers that the utterance of racial terms directed at 
him (as a Black person) was no different than what other nationalities commonly 
experience from time to time.262 Smithers recognized that such derogatory terms 
are uttered, but returned to the fact that the continuous and excessive use of 
racist slurs aimed at him indicated that it was “more or less personal.”263 Smithers 
maintained, “I think it was really meant to hurt me more than anything. 
There’s quite a difference, that’s the way I feel, that is my opinion.”264 Perhaps 
emblematic of the Crown’s insensitivity to Smithers and his experience of racism, 
and the Crown’s dismissiveness of this history, McGuigan then asked, “Do you 
feel you might be over sensitive on that [sic]?”265 Smithers replied, “No I have 
been brought up with it all my life, but I still, you know, I don’t understand why 
I had to go through what -- why [Cobby] had to persist on that continuously. You 
know he excessed it, quite obviously.”266 McGuigan’s questioning points to two 
things: Either Smithers was accustomed to the racism, and it really had no effect 
on him, or he was simply over-sensitive because the derogatory name-calling 
was part and parcel of the game. This was the crude and unsophisticated binary 
offered to Smithers. In either event, the Crown sought to invalidate Smithers’s 
experience of racism and its impact on him. 
Smithers’s acknowledgement during cross-examination of being accustomed 
to some level of racism may have been partly performative and meant to 
demonstrate his masculinity and toughness in a notoriously violent sport. Like 
other Black players, he was expected to endure such racism. Washington Post 
journalist David DuPree wrote about Smithers’s case in 1975. In the course of 
researching, he interviewed Smithers and others. Regarding the racial epithets 
hurled at Smithers, DuPree wrote, “Smithers says the name-calling has always 
hurt. He usually didn’t let it show.”267 Following the trial, Smithers was granted 
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racial slurs. Smithers commented to DuPree, “And people still call me [ni***r]. 
That’s the most degrading thing anybody can call me, but I guess I’m just 
supposed to take it.”268
What emerges is the idea that a Black player, when faced with racial slurs, 
should simply sustain the taunts and not be “over-sensitive.” When trial court 
Justice B. Barry Shapiro sentenced Smithers to six months’ incarceration in an 
adult training centre in Brampton,269 he encouraged Smithers to continue playing 
sports.270 However, he counselled Smithers to “restrain his temper” and that, 
“[i]n case of racial insults, you should seek redress in a nonviolent manner.”271 
This demands that victims of racial discrimination, such as Smithers, keep their 
cool in the face of patent verbal and physical aggression in addition to explicitly 
threatening and intimidating behaviour. It expects nothing of racial aggressors to 
hold their animus in check and refrain from verbalizing their prejudices.
Justice Shapiro’s advice harkened to imagery of Black athletes who have 
shouldered the racism aimed at them. Such symbolism was weaponized against 
Smithers. For example, a white spectator once told him, “Jackie Robinson took 
it, you better learn how to take it, too.”272 As is well known, Robinson was the 
first Black player in Major League Baseball and was subjected to racism by fellow 
players, opponents, and spectators.273 As part of the quid pro quo in being 
permitted to play, Robinson needed to demonstrate his ability to endure the 
racism foisted on him.274 Robinson was seen as a hero for his accomplishments, for 
being a sports pioneer, and for not giving in to his justified anger. Consequently, 
Robinson’s stoicism as an adult was weaponized against Smithers, who, unlike 
Robinson, was still a teenager. Smithers’s father, Donald, further posited that, 
at the time of the tragic game against Applewood, “Paul was just a young boy. 
Who can say he should have controlled his emotions when players and fans were 
calling him ‘[ni***r]’ every game? He was bound to explode.”275 More generally, 
the elder Smithers asserted that over the course of the trial, there was an attitude 
or expectation 
268. Ibid at C5.
269. Michael Solomon, “Supporters crowded courthouse as Smithers gets six months,” The Globe 
and Mail (5 June 1974) 1.
270. DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
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that a black person should go out on the ice and just let people call him a “[ni***r]” 
or whatever, even if it comes from parents (in the stands), and that you shouldn’t 
lose your cool. That there was a white boy killed because you couldn’t take it being 
called [ni***r].276
Leaving aside Donald Smithers’s partiality, his statements were reasonable and 
tacitly pointed to the repeated failure of league officials to respond to the racism 
his son experienced. 
IV. SUSPECTED RACIAL BIAS AND THE JURY
Racism played a feature role in the events leading up to Cobby’s death, despite 
the Supreme Court’s efforts to obscure it. There were also valid concerns that 
racial prejudice may have played a role in the jury’s decision making. This should 
hardly be surprising. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario acknowledged in 1993:
Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community’s psyche. 
A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views. A much 
larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes. 
Furthermore, our institutions, including the criminal justice system, reflect and 
perpetuate those negative stereotypes. These elements combine to infect our society 
as a whole with the evil of racism. Blacks are among the primary victims of that 
evil.277 
This would have been no less the case some nineteen years earlier, when Smithers’s 
trial occurred in 1974. Concerns about empanelling persons with racial bias 
persist today.278 As Randall Kennedy observes, when the n-word is explicitly 
invoked in the context of jury deliberations, this taints the process and can also 
impact jurors who hear such language.279 
At Smithers’s trial, the jury heard testimony over a two-week period. Justice 
Shapiro instructed the jury that they could find Smithers guilty either of unlawful 
act manslaughter or on the lesser and included crime of “common assault.”280 
The jurors took two hours to deliberate before arriving at their verdict, finding 
Smithers guilty of unlawful act manslaughter.281 Those empanelled to determine 
276. Gerald Seniuk, “Smithers once afraid, now vows he will fight,” The Globe and Mail (5 
June 1974) 10. 
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280. Smithers, supra note 12 at 511; “Youth, 17, guilty,” supra note 173. 
281. “Mississauga Youth Guilty in Fight Death After Hockey Game,” The Globe and Mail (23 
April 1974) 1. 
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Smithers’s guilt were nine men and three women, all white. This did not in itself 
mean that the entire jury was biased, though it reflects a problematic and systemic 
lack of representation and diversity. Yet in light of Cobby’s malfunctioning 
epiglottis and the seemingly tenuous connection between Smithers’s kick and 
Cobby’s asphyxiation, the jury’s verdict triggered (or perhaps confirmed) 
suspicions of racism or some underlying agenda. Joyce Smithers commented to 
a Globe and Mail reporter that “the jury made it a political type of thing. They 
made it themselves.”282 Though no further explanation was provided, perhaps the 
political motive Joyce Smithers alluded to was in an all-white jury finding her 
son guilty of having challenged the anti-Black racism of his tormentors. When 
Dr. Ross Runfola interviewed Smithers and others for his article, published 
in The New York Times, Runfola asked Smithers why he had been convicted 
of manslaughter. Runfola reported, “Without pause, [Smithers] blurted out, 
‘Because I’m [B]lack.’”283 Runfola added that Smithers then “quickly offered an 
opinion designed to be more acceptable to his father, who is standing nearby.”284 
Smithers clarified, “No. The fact that I’m [B]lack is not the point. Any 12 decent 
people would have found me not guilty. I think I got a bad deal from the jury, 
especially in view of the medical testimony.”285 
The following year, Smithers provided further insights on racism and the 
jury. Dan Proudfoot, writing for Weekend Magazine in 1975, interviewed the 
Smithers family for his article. Proudfoot wrote, “Paul Smithers and his parents 
were sure the jury had been racist in its verdict, as sure as Paul had been that 
Barrie Cobby had been a racist calling him a [ni***r] and a [c**n] during the 
game.”286 Anticipating some doubts about this statement, Smithers offered: 
I know, I know, white people think [B]lacks are always looking for racism where 
there isn’t any, […] but believe me, I knew that jury would find me guilty. You can 
tell, just looking somebody in the face, whether they’re prejudiced or not – and the 
only time those people looked at me was when something came out that made me 
look bad. I knew what to expect from those people.287 
Smithers’s intuitions about the jury’s attitudes toward him may have been 
accurate, at least in part. Information came to light in 1975 that one of the 
female jurors at his trial expressed views indicating a racial bias against Smithers. 
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This was revealed in an interview with Leonard and Brenda Cobby, who were 
lamenting their son’s vilification as a racist in the news coverage of the trial. 
Leonard Cobby posited: 
It was so slanted. I mean, we know one of the jurors, she lives near here, who said 
she knew after two or three days of the trial that the ‘Black Basket’ was guilty. But 
anybody reading the newspapers bloody well wouldn’t have been able to come to 
that conclusion.288 
It is worth noting that the defence started to call their own witnesses on 18 April, 
while the Crown began calling witnesses as early as 8 April. Thus, if the juror 
“knew after two or three days of the trial” that Smithers was guilty,289 this would 
mean that she had already prejudged the case before hearing all of the Crown’s 
evidence, much less from the defence’s witnesses.
Following on the heels of Leonard Cobby’s statements, Smithers’s new counsel 
(and future Attorney General and Chief Justice of Ontario), Roy McMurtry, 
wrote to Federal Minister of Justice Otto Lang requesting ministerial review due 
to jury bias and seeking a new trial.290 He based the request on the Proudfoot 
article.291 In his letter, McMurtry expressed, “One could also draw the inference 
that if one of the jurors was prepared to speak so openly about the matter, that in 
all probability there were other jurors harboring similar prejudices.”292 In support 
of McMurtry’s letter and his former client, Smithers’s trial counsel (and appellate 
counsel before the Court of Appeal for Ontario), Arthur Maloney, dispatched his 
own communication to Lang, dated 6 August 1975. Maloney asserted, “It seems 
to me that if there is any reason whatsoever to believe that even one member of 
the jury, motivated by racial hatred, had made up his mind in advance of hearing 
the evidence, that this should in itself be a ground for a new trial.”293
In his written communication, Maloney provided further information 
supporting the position that a juror was racially biased against Smithers. 
Independent of Leonard Cobby’s disclosure about one juror, Maloney had 
learned from a separate source that the daughter of a juror expressed surprise 
288. Ibid at 8. 
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that her mother was empanelled, since “she had a dislike of Negroes.”294 The 
juror’s daughter purportedly further advised “that there was only one person who 
disliked Negroes more [than her mother], and that was her father.”295 Maloney 
revealed that the daughter relayed this information to a lawyer named F.G. Felkai. 
Felkai, in turn, informed Maloney of the statements a few days after the trial. 
When The Globe and Mail followed up with Felkai about the identity of the juror, 
he refused to disclose her identity but indicated that if the matter proceeded to a 
new trial, he would do so at that time.296 
The Department of Justice responded to McMurtry’s letter and indicated 
that it would consider reviewing the jury issue following the Court decision.297 
After the Court’s ruling to affirm the decisions below, Smithers began to serve 
his six-month sentence and was ultimately paroled after three months.298 After 
his release, the Smithers family was in communication with the Department of 
Justice regarding the application for ministerial review initiated by McMurtry in 
1975.299 Following the Court’s dismissal of Smithers’s appeal, the Department 
did not pursue the matter because there was, in its view, no further request from 
Smithers’s counsel to do so.300 However, even if such a request had been made, 
where ministerial review is granted the usual remedy is a retrial. At this stage, 
Donald Smithers was seeking not a retrial but a public investigation into the 
original trial and, particularly, the issue of whether one or more jurors were 
racially biased against his son.301 The Department of Justice indicated that such an 
investigation would be within the purview of the Attorney General of Ontario.302 
There is no indication that any public investigation was ever undertaken on the 
issue of racism among the jurors, let alone any other issue surrounding the trial. 
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V. CONCLUSION
This article tells a historical counter-narrative of the Smithers case. It draws 
substantially from the perspective of Paul Smithers, through both his testimony 
at trial and interviews in the years immediately following it. It is a story that 
highlights his experiences of anti-Black racism, their impact on him, and his 
attempts to resist such discrimination. The case and its racial dimensions have 
remained hitherto unnoticed in Canadian legal histories on race. This study 
has sought to fill this gap. In presenting this counter-story, I have attempted to 
challenge the Court’s official narrative, largely on the basis that it substantially 
understates the extent and depth of Cobby’s racial transgressions, which were 
perpetrated in the presence of both adults who participated in the discrimination 
and arena officials who failed to intervene. 
As the Court is an appellate court, it made no formal findings of fact. 
Nevertheless, in narrating the facts of the Smithers case, the Court relied on a 
selective interpretation of the evidence presented at the jury trial. The Court’s 
factual matrix projects an especially Crown-oriented view of the events. It does 
not even acknowledge the conflicting evidence presented by the defence. One 
might divine from this that writing a case history is a zero-sum game, which 
must be told in a rather caricatured manner and solely from the perspective of the 
legal victor—here, the Crown.303 But more devastating and condemnable is the 
fact that the Court’s portrayal of Smithers as an angry Black aggressor, together 
with their obscurement of the deep-seated and systemic racism he experienced, 
strongly resemble a white supremacist narrative of what transpired, even if the 
Justices themselves harboured no obvious or actual racial animus. This may be 
a harsh statement. However, I am reminded of African-American legal scholar 
D. Marvin Jones’s observation that Black men “are perceived as congenitally 
disobedient and lawless. This is true because of how white male ideas about 
manhood distinguished between man—read civilized man—and savage.”304 
By presenting the facts in the way that it chose to, the Court in Smithers left itself 
open to such criticism.
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In addition to providing a counter-narrative, this article also highlighted the 
Crown prosecutors’ role in minimizing the impact of race in the case. Lastly, this 
article brought renewed attention to concerns about overt racial bias, regarding 
at least one member of the jury, as well as systemic discrimination, as the jury 
was all white. Echoing the Washington Supreme Court’s recognition of its own 
contribution to the devaluation of Black lives, my hope is that this article will 
encourage Canadian courts and other actors within the legal system to reflect 
on their contributions to such devaluation of both Black lives and Black voices. 
Though the outcome might not be any different, a one-sided story does not 
serve the ends of justice—certainly not when the story of a victim of racial 
violence is erased. 
The Smithers case, despite the concerns raised above about the manner in 
which the facts are represented, is taught annually in most, if not all, criminal 
law courses across Canada. It is not a decision buried in a vast sea of thousands 
of forgotten Supreme Court judgments. This is not a judgment that is allowed 
to be forgotten. In crafting this counter-narrative, I have tried to allow for a 
long-silenced Black voice to pierce through the juridical veil. At the very least, 
we can now engage with the factual matrix of the case anew, through a lens 
that demonstrates greater sensitivity to the systemic racism that continues 
in Canada—a matter of tremendous importance for criminal law.305 Or, 
alternatively, one may choose to remain deliberately ignorant and disregard this 
broader understanding of the case in favour of the official tale that was spun, over 
forty years ago, by the Supreme Court.
305. Indeed, we could also ask whether a case similar to Smithers, if decided today with a 
racially diverse jury, would produce different conclusions on a number of issues including 
voluntariness, causation, or self-defence.

